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The determinants of audit fees - evidence
from the voluntary sector
Vivien Beattie, Alan Goodacre, Ken Pratt and Joanna Stevenson*
Ahstrad — Given the growing demand for uccounlabilily in the public sector, there is a need to begin to inve.sti-
gate audit pricing issues in this sector. This study makes three contributions. First, it develops and es^timates. for the
llrst time, a nn»del of audit fee determinants for the charity sector. As in previous private sector company studies,
size, organisational complexity and audit firm location are the major determinants. A positive association between
audit fees and fees tor non-audit services is also observed. Charity sector factors of empirical significance include
the nature of lhe charity (i.e.. grant-making or fund-raising), its area of activity and ihc importance of trading in-
come. Separate nuxlels for granl-making and fund-raising charities rellect the relative complexity of the audit of
fund-raising charities. Second, the lower auditor concentration in the charity sector market, compared to the private
sector market, permits a more powerful test of whether large firms and/or auditor expertise are rewarded with a fee
premium. In the more complex audit cnvirnnmeni of fund-raising charities, the results show that Big Six audil firms
receive higher audit fees (IS.S'/f. on average) than non-Big Six firms. Also. non-Big Six audit firms with charity
expertise arc rewarded with a fee premium over other non-Big Six firms. Finally, the study demonstrates that the
charity audit fee rate is significantly lower than that of private seclor companies: in fact it is approximately half. A
change in the reporting of charity audit fees is proposed lo reflect any element of "chariiable giving' by the audit
firm. Keywords: audit fees: auditor expertise; charity sector: fee premium; non-audit services.
1. Introduction
The tnarket for audit services is recognised to be
segmented into distinct sub-markets. To date, re-
search has focused on the private sector market
(which itself comprises di.stinct sub-markets). The
principal issues that have been investigated are
market structure (including the related issues of
market concentration, auditor selection and auditor
change) and audit pricing. Early audit pricing stud-
ies were motivated by concerns that the top tier
audit firms (then the Big Eight) were earning ex-
cess economic rents due to the existence of an oli-
gopolistic market structure. Later studies,
conducted in a more competitive auditing environ-
ment, were motivated by concerns regarding low-
balling, and the potential resultant weakening of
auditor independence and reduction in audit quali-
ty. Most recently, attention has shifted to examine
the impact of auditor industry specialisation (i.e.,
expertise) on audit fees (for example, Peaison and
Trompeter, 1994: Craswell, Francis and Taylor,
1995; CuUinan, 1998): results to date have been
contradictory.
In addition to the extensive literature on audit
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pricing in the private sector, there are also a few
studies that investigate sub-markets within the
public sector (e.g., Baber. 1983: Baber, Brooks and
Ricks. 1987). The objective of these studies is to
establish the generalisability of findings regarding
audit fee determinants from the private sector to
other audit markets, and also to identify additional
factors reflecting the unique aspeets of the ac-
counting and auditing environment in the public
sector. Moreover, the demand for accountability in
this sector is incteasing and so audit pricing stud-
ies of sub-markets within the sector are of impor-
tance in their own right. To our knowledge,
however, no study has investigated audit pricing in
the voluntary sector.
The voluntary sector is seen to be the "major
third force (in addition to the private and public
sectors) in society without which much social pro-
vision would seize up" (SCVO 1997:4). In many
countries, political and fiscal constraints on the
welfare state are resulting in an increased flow of
public resources into the sector, with local govern-
ment contracting with the sector to provide serv-
ices. The charity sector is the most significant
component of the voluntary sector.' Approximately
' There are considerable difficulties associated with defin-
ing the charity sector and measuring its si/e. Narrow opera-
tional definitions exclude museums, universities, private
colleges and schools, local enterprise companies, hospital
trusts, housing associations, friendly societies, trade unions,
and places of worship, because they are insufficiently oriented
towards the public benefit, are not sufficienily independent, or
information is not readily available.
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4% of the paid UK labour force is estimated to be
employed in this sector, with registered charities in
England and Wales having an income of £16bn in
19% (Pianca and Blackwood. 1996:1). This repre-
sents approximately 3 ^ % of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) (Wise, 1995:3). There are approximately
187.000 registered charities in England and Wales
alone (Pharoah and Smerdon, 1998).-
Currently, public confidence in this sector is low,
due to a number of highly publicised scandals and
frauds and poor quality reporting (Accountancv
Age, 1998; The Herald. 1999). There is clearly a
need to demonstrate greater accountability if this
sector is to achieve its full potential (NCVO.
1998). Moreover, accountability must be especial-
ly rigorous in this sector due to the weakness of the
'customer' (i.e.. beneficiary). The recent creation
of unofficial independent monitoring bodies, such
as The Accreditation Bureau for Fundraising
Organisations, seeks to restore the public's trust
{Accoimiancy Age, 1998). The independent audit
is a key means of providing accountability, but the
requirement for an external audit depends on the
exact nature of the charity and its location.
Incorporated charities whose annual gross income
is above £250.000, or whose balance sheet total
exceeds £l.4m, are subject to a full statutory audit
under the Companies Act 1985.
Unincorporated charities in England and Wales
also require an audit if annual income or expendi-
ture exceeds £250.000 (Charities Act 1993) but in
Scotland the threshold is £100.000 (Law Reform
Act 1990). Charities falling below these thresholds
may nevertheless have provisions in their govern-
ing documents that require an independent audit.
Generally, smaller charities may be required to un-
dergo an independent examination of their finan-
cial statements or to appoint a reporting accountant.
Auditors of charities must comply with the
Auditing Practices Board's Auditing Standards
and take into account the additional considerations
contained in the 1996 Practice Note 'The Audit of
Charities" (AFB, 1996). Rule.s on the appointment
and remuneration of auditors are contained in the
relevant legislation (e.g.. The Companies Acts, the
Charities Act 1993). However, for non-incorporat-
ed charities there are no members to ratify audit
appointments and there is no formal requirement
for an annual general meeting as a forum for ap-
pointment, so the choice of auditor is effectively
left to trustees. Audit reports are normally ad-
dressed to the trustees or directors (if incorporat-
ed), although the charity's governing document or
specific legislation may identify another or other
- One need only look to North American economies to see
the poienlial for growth in ihis seclor. In Canada, for example,
expenditure by registered charities represented \2% of GDP in
1993 (Bryden. 1996; Sharpe. 1994).
parties to whom the auditor should report. For ex-
ample, the British Museum is audited by the
National Audit Office which reports to the Houses
of Parliament, under the Museums and Galleries
Act 1992. since the museum is predominantly
funded by the government. Additionally, there is a
general statutory duty under the 1993 Act (for
England and Wales) for auditors to report certain
matters such as misconduct or mismanagement by
trustees directly to the Charities Commission,
which is the regulatory body. In Scotland, auditors
have a right (not a duty) to report such matters to
the Lord Advocate. Oddly, charitable companies
are not subject to this reporting duty under current
Companies Act provisions.
All charities in the UK should adopt the
accounting requirements of The Statement of
Recommended Practice (SORP) Accounting by
Charities, issued in 1995 by the Charities
Commission. This is supplementary to the ac-
counting requirements of the Companies Act 1985.
Charities Act 1993 and Financial Reporting
Standards. The SORP was issued in recognition of
the need to improve the quality of charity report-
ing. The key feature of the SORP is the require-
ment for a Statement of Financial Activities
(SOFA) in lieu of an Income and Expenditure
Account, though the latter may still be required
under legislation such as the Companies Act. The
SOFA shows all incoming resources (capital and
revenue), direct charitable expenditure separate
from other expenditure such as fundraising and ad-
ministration costs, and a reconciliation of move-
ments in the charity's separately identified funds
for the year.
Auditors in the charity sector must therefore fa-
miliarise themselves with the SORP requirements
as well as the legislation and regulations particular
to the constitution of their client charity, its gov-
erning documents and the additional auditing con-
siderations outlined in the APB Practice Note. All
of our sample charities fell within the audit thresh-
olds and were subject to the SORP requirement to
disclose audit fees in addition to fees "for other fi-
nancial services such as taxation advice, consul-
tancy, financial advice and accountancy' (SORP.
para. 162. p.37).
Audit market structure in the charity sector dif-
fers substantially from that found in the private
sector. In the UK, the private sector exhibits a high
and rising level of supplier concentration. Panel B
of Table 1 (extracted from Pong, 1999: 461) shows
that, in 1995, the Big Six audited 75% of UK list-
ed companies and accounted for a market share of
92% based on audit fees. The equivalent figures
for the charity sector (Panel A in Table I taken from
Barings (1998)) show that the Big Six audited just
25% in number of the top 2,620 charities and ac-
counted for a market share of 26% based on audit
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Table 1
Comparison of auditor market shares in the charity
Panel A: VK charities in 1997 (n=262()) '
No clients
Audit ft nn
KPMG
Coopers & Lybrand
Deloitte & Touche
Emst & Young
Binder Hamlyn
Price Waterhouse
Grant Thornton
Horwath Ciark Whitehill
BDO Stoy Hayward
Kidsons Impey
Panneil Kenr Forster
Neville Russell
Buzzacott
National Audit Office
Arthur Andersen
Total-
Market share of top 4 ranked
Market share of top 6 ranked
Market share of BIG SIX
Total number of audit firms'
Panel B: UK listed companies in
Audit ftni!
KPMG
Coopers & Lybrand
Price Waterhouse
Emst & Young
Touche Ross
Arthur Andersen
Binder Hamiyn
BDO Stoy Hayward
Grant Thornton
Panneil Kerr Forster
Market share of top 4 ranked
Market share of top 6 ranked
[i.e.. market share of BIG SIX|
Total number of audit firms
Notes
audited
167
158
115
107
105
95
68
68
^
58
57
55
5di
39
4
2620
1995 (n=M
1. Data obtained from pages 1.30 and 1.31 ol
Market
share %
6.4
6.0
4.4
4.1
4.0
3.6
2.6
2.6
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
1.9
1.5
0.2
iOO.O
20.9
28.5
24.7
No clients
Market
share %
20.2
15.4
12.5
i l .6
9.2
6.0
3.8
3.4
3.1
1.7
59.7
74.9
and listed
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7
9
10
ii
12
i3
14
na
620
Rank
i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
106
Barings (1998).
2. Total audit fees are estimated from the data on page
3. Obtained by counting no of separate audit
4. Extract from Table 3 on page
5. Table includes the top 9 audit
461 of Pong
company markets in the UK
Total audit
fees (£ni}
i.32
1.51
1.19
0.66
1.54
0.78
0.58
0.31
0.50
0.39
0.40
0.34
0.40
0.67
na
20.70
.30 of Barings (i998).
firms on pages 8.3-8
(1999).
Market
share %
6.4
7.3
5.7
3.2
7.4
3.8
2.8
i.5
2.4
1.9
1.9
1.6
1.9
3.2
na
100.0
22.6
33.8
26.4
Audit fees
Market
share %
22.2
23.3
15.7
18.1
7.0
5.5
1.6
0.7
0.8
0.8
79.4
91.9
36 of Barings (1998).
Rank
3
2
4
7
i
5
8
14
9
12
iO
i3
10
6
na
Hank
2
I
4
3
5
6
7
iO
9
8
firms, based on either measure of market share, plus Arthur Andersen.
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fees. Moreover, the composition of the top six
charity auditors differs from the Big Six. Binder
Hamlyn, a 'second tier' firm, audits 105 charities.
ranking fifth and emerges as the market leader
based on audit fees. Further, the National Audit
Office also features in the top tier of charity audi-
tors, ranking sixth based on audit fees but based on
a smaller number of audits. The 'outlier* of the Big
Six is Arthur Andersen, who apparently undertook
just four charity audits (Barings. 1998: 8.3).^
These differences in market structure provide a
unique setting within which to examine the hnks
between market structure and pricing (an aspect
of market conduct) that have concerned previous
researchers.
The different audit risks and audit market struc-
ture mean that the charity sector is a valuable set-
ting within which to develop and test audit pricing
models, thereby extending our understanding of
pricing issues generally. Moreover, the growing
importance of this sector in economies worldwide,
and the need for a high level of accountability,
mean that an understanding of audit fee determi-
nants in this sector is important in its own right.
The present study has four objectives. First, to de-
velop and estimate a model of charity audit fee de-
terminants. Second, to assess the existence of a
Big Six brand name premium in a market in which
none of the Big Six firms is considered a special-
ist. Third, to test the pricing impact of expertise in
a niche market where the Big Six firms have less
dominance than is commonly encountered. Fourth,
to undertake an explicit comparison of the level of
charity audit fees with those prevailing in the pri-
vate sector. While the latter does not contribute di-
rectly to our general understanding of audit
pricing, it will provide preliminary evidence to
form the basis of further research on audit risks in
the charity sector.
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature on
audit pricing, covering first the private sector and
then the limited number of studies on the public
sector. Studies that specifically examine the im-
pact of expertise, in the form of market share, are
also reviewed. Methods are described in Section 3,
including a discussion of audit risks in the charity
sector, model specification and the procedures for
the comparison of audit fee levels at the sectoral
level. Section 4 deals with sample selection, fol-
lowed by the presentation and discussion of results
in Section 5. A final section summarises and con-
cludes.
' However, in 1^44. Anhur Anderson and Binder Hamlyn
effectively merged when the tour major UK otTiues of Binder
Hamlyn were taken under the Arthur Andersen umbrella.
2. Prior literature
There exists a well-developed literature on the de-
terminants of audit fees in the private sector, dat-
ing from the seminal article by Simunic (1980).
Three principal lines of research have emerged,
which focus on the presence of a Big Eight fee pre-
mium, the presence of low-balling, and the impact
of non-audit services (NAS) provision. The main
objective of Simunic's study was to investigate the
impact of the audit firm size variable, after con-
trolling for cross-sectional differences in auditee
characteristics. At this time, rising concentration
ratios within the market had led to concerns that
the Big Eight were behaving monopolistically, i.e.,
the audit industry was not competitive. In the mar-
ket of the late 198{)s, however, the concern was
that audit firms were 'low-balling", i.e.. quoting
fees below cost to secure clients. Thus, this line of
research focused on initial audit engagements. The
third main line of research focused on the impact
on audit fees of the provision of NAS by the in-
cumbent auditor, amid concerns that such provi-
sion impaired auditor independence.
Simunic (1980) develops a pricing tiiodel in
which the audit fee is determined by differences in
loss exposure, differences in the assessed loss-
sharing ratio, differences in auditor production
functions, and auditor identity. He notes that the
observation of a Big Eight premium, while consis-
tent with the extraction of monopoly rents, is also
consistent with the existence of product differenti-
ation accruing to high reputation. Moreover, the
potential existence of economies of scale would
offset both of these factors (Simunic, 1980: 170).
Loss exposure is proxied using auditee size
(total assets), complexity (number of consolidated
subsidiaries, number of industries engaged in. and
proportion of foreign assets), and risky asset types
(proportion of debtors and proportion of stock).
The loss-sharing ratio is proxied by the accounting
rate of return, the existence of a net loss in the two
prior years, and the presence of a 'subject to" qual-
ification in the current year. Differences in auditor
production functions are captured by an audit
tenure variable.
Simunic finds that auditee size is the most im-
portant determinant of audit fees. Only the ac-
counting rate of return and tenure variables were
not significant in the regression equation, and the
overall explanatory power was 46%. The key vari-
able of interest, a Big Fight dummy variable, was
insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis that price com-
petition prevails could not be rejected. Moreover,
the negative sign on the coefficient suggested that
the Big Eight enjoy economies of scale, which are
passed on as lower fees to auditees (Simunic.
1980: 187-188).
In subsequent studies, the main control variables
in Simunic"s model have consistently been found
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to be significant. The basic specification of the
audit fee model has remained essentially un-
changed over the last 20 years, although one or
two new explanatory variables have been added.^
The explanatory power of the model has generally
been in the region of 70%. The model has been es-
timated using many different data sets, drawn from
several countries and time periods, in an attempt to
assess the generalisability of extant findings and.
in some cases, to resolve conflicting findings re-
garding the audit fee premium variable.
Studies that focus on the existence of a Big Eight
(more recently. Big Six) fee premium include
Simunic (1980), Simon (1985), Palmrose (1986a),
Erancis and Simon (1987), Beatty (1993). and Gist
and Michaels (1995) in the US; Taylor and Baker
(1981). Taffier and Ramalinggam (1982), Chan,
Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993), Brinn. Peel and
Roberts (1994). Pong and Whittington (1994). and
Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1996) in the UK;
Erancis (1984) and Erancis and Stokes (1986) in
Australia; Firth (1985) and Johnson. Walker and
Westergaard (1995) in New Zealand; Chung and
Lindsay (1988) and Anderson and Zeghal (1994)
in Canada; Low, Tan and Koh (1990) in Singapore;
Lee (1996) and Gul (1999) in Hong Kong; Simon,
Teo and Trompeter (1992) in Hong Kong,
Malaysia and Singapore; Simon, Ramanan and
Dugar (1986) in India; and Langendijk (1997) in
the Netherlands.
Results, while inconclusive, are suggestive of
the existence of a fee premium in the case of small
auditees, but not large auditees (e.g., Palmrose,
1986a; Erancis and Simon. 1987; Talfler and
Ramalinggam. 1982; and Erancis and Stokes.
1986). This premium is generally attributed to the
existence of differentiated audit services, consis-
tent with the predictions of DeAngelo (1981a).
Studies that focus on the existence of low-
balling are of two types: those that focus on real
markets and those that use data generated from ar-
tificial markets. Studies using real market data in-
clude Simon and Erancis (1988). Turpen (1990).
Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) in the US; Gregory
and Collier (1996) in the UK; Butterworth and
"" Gist (1992. 1994) examines lhe audilee's regulatory com-
plexity and finds proxies for Ihi,s factor to he significant and
e,\pli(,-ablc ill terms of scale economies and specialisation eJ'-
t'ects. Iyer and Iyer( 1996) examine lhe impact of the Big Eight
mergers on tees and find none,
-^  Craswelt and Francis (1999) conclude, following Dye's
(1991) anaiylical work, thiit the public disclosure of audit fees
in Australia precludes initial engagement discounting ,'iueh as
observed in the U.S. However, ihis conclusion is not consistent
wiih the UK evidenee of Gregory and Collier (1996) who
report a significant discount in a selting where audit fees are
disclosed,
'' There is some evidence that this general finding is contin-
gent upon the type of NAS supplied and confined to corporate
finance and tax services rather than consultancy services
(E/,zamel et al,. 1997),
Houghton (1995) and Crasweli and Erancis (1999)
in Australia. DeAngelo's (1981b) model predicts
that low-balling will occur. Because audit cost
functions are unobservable, fee cutting on initial
engagements is used as a proxy for fees cut below
the cost of conducting the audit. This may result in
model mis-specification. A significant fee reduc-
tion in the initial engagement year is observed
in both the US and the UK (Simon and Erancis.
1988: -24%; Turpen, 1990: -19%; Ettredge and
Greenberg. 1990:-25Vr; Gregory and Collier. 1996;
-22%). However, this is not found in Australia.^
Studies that use artificial markets include
Schatzberg (1990. 1994) and Schatzberg and
Sevcik (1994). Schatzberg (1990) flnds evidence
consistent with DeAngelo's (1981b) prediction
that low-balling will occur when transactions costs
are positive. Schatzberg (1994) and Schatzberg
and Sevcik (1994) extend this work to examine the
relationship between low-balling (price) and audi-
tor independence (quality) and find evidence thai
transactions costs are not a necessary condition for
low-balling to occur. An alternative rationale is the
existence of cross-sectional variation in audit cost
and quality and an informational advantage that
accrues to an incumbent auditor-client pair regard-
ing future variations in these audit dimensions.
The impact of NAS provision has been the focus
of several studies including Simunic (1984),
Palmrose (1986b), Parkash and Venable (1993)
and Davis, Ricchiutc and Trompeter (1993) in the
US; Ezzamel, Gwilliam and Holland (1996, 1997)
in the UK; Barkess and Simnett (1994) in
Austraiia; and Firth (1997) in Norway. These stud-
ies generally show a positive relation between
audit and non-audit fees,^ which is interpreted by
some authors as due to knowledge spillover effects
and/or audit production efficiencies and a price-
elastic demand for audit services. While other au-
thors dispute this interpretation, a satisfactory
alternative has yet to be proposed. Further, using
production function data that allows them to con-
trol for audit effort. Davis et al. (1993) do not find
a significant relation, suggesting that the link is not
due to a pricing premium. Parkash and Venable
(1993) distinguish between recurring and non-re-
curring NAS. arguing that only recurring NAS are
likely to result in a reduction in perceived auditor
independence. They find that auditees purchase
higher levels of recurring NAS when they engage
industry specialists, which suggests that the selec-
tion of an industry specialist is a quality signal that
permits the auditee to purchase higher levels of
recurring NAS than would otherwise be the case.
Organisational differences can result in differ-
ences with respect to factors that determine the
supply and demand, and thus the fees, for audit
services. A number of studies have examined the
determinants of audit fees in the context of the
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public sector (Baber, 1983; Beck and Barefield.
1986: Baber, Brooks, and Ricks. 1987: Rubin.
1988: Ward, Elder, and Kattelus. 1994: Sanders,
Allen and Korte, 1995: Deis and Giroux. 1996:
and Bandyopadhyay and Kao. 1998).^ These stud-
ies are all conducted in North American settings,
most frequently the municipal audit tnarket. It is
found that, in addition to the determinants of audit
fees in the private sector, additional variables that
reflect the unique aspects of the public sector
environment have significant explanatory power
(e.g., political factors).
Finally, a recent development in the literature is
a focus on the impact of auditor expertise and spe-
cialisation. Some studies have found that auditors
with a specialism in a particular sector receive an
audit premium, but others have found that such au-
ditors charge lower audit fees. In an early US
study, Palmrose (1986a) found no evidence of an
"industry specialism' premium. Using a large sam-
ple of Australian listed companies, Craswell.
Francis and Taylor (1995) attempt to disentangle
the two components of the Big Eight fee premium:
the general brand name premium and the industry
specialisation premium. Three levels of audit qual-
ity are posited and supported by their evidence: at
the highest level specialist Big Eight firms, then
non-specialist Big Eight firms, then non-Big Eight
firms. Matthews, Jubb and Houghton (1997) ex-
tend this work to investigate the structure in the
market for audit services in Australia based on the
traditional Big Six/non-Big Six dichotomy and a
specialisation definition of 20% of state industry
audit fee market share, i.e., a four-sector system.
Their audit pricing evidence suggests that these
four sectors collapse into two levels of audit qual-
ity. The higher level includes specialist Big Six,
non-specialist Big Six and specialist non-Big Six,
while the lower level comprises non-specialist
non-Big Six audit firms.^
Using fee data from listed Hong Kong compa-
^ While this paper was under review, we became aware of a
working paper hy Clatworihy, Mellett and Peel (2000) thai ex-
amines audit tees in UK NHS trusts. This is n market in which
auditors are appointed by the Audit Commission and private
sector auditors are in the minority. Their model explains 41^c
of observed fee variation. Unusually, they find a significant
nejiative relationship between audit and NAS fees, supporting
the 'knowledge spillover' hypothesis. No evidence is found of
a Big Six auditor premium. They also report that the ratio of
auditor foes to turnover is less than half that for private health-
care companies. This finding is attributed to differences in
audit risk, supply-side factors such as labour cost differentials
and/or demand-side factors, such as the existence of a domi-
nant purchaser and regulator.
" Ritson. Jubb and Houghton (1997) develop a continuous
measure of the extent of change in industry specialisaiion and
Hnd this variable lo be significant in a mode! of auditor
change. Specialisation is measured as the percentage of louil
revenues earned by the auditor from the auditee's industry
(Ritson et al., 1997:10), a measure that avoids the use of a sub-
jective cut-off rule.
nies, DeFond, Francis and Wong (2000) find evi-
dence of Big Six premia both for general brand
name and for industry specialisation. Interestingly,
however, they find that a specialist non-Big Six
firm in one sector discounts fees relative to other
audit firms. They conclude that Big Six brand
name reputation is a necessary foundation on
which to extract a fee premium based on industry
specialisation.
Researchers have also investigated other audit
markets that are less dominated by the Big Six.
Cullinan (1997, 1998) examined the effect of in-
dustry expertise on audit fees in the US multi-etn-
ployer pension plan market, a market in which the
Big Six firms have a relatively small market share.
Results indicated that non-Big Six firms with in-
dustry expertise received a fee premium over non-
specialist firms, whereas Big Six firms with larger
market shares did not. This suggests that non-Big
Six firms may be able to benefit from market spe-
cialism in niche assurance service markets. Earlier,
Ward et al. (1994) had found that an 'auditor ex-
perience' variable was positively associated with
audit fees in their study of US municipalities. The
study on school district audits in Texas by Deis
and Giroux (1996) found that auditors with greater
market share charged lower audit fees, as did
Pearson and Trompeter (1994) in their study of the
US insurance company audit market. Thus, over-
all, the evidence for an "expertise" audit fee premi-
um is somewhat mixed.
3. Methods
3.1. Audit risks in the charity sector
Before describing the audit fee model adopted in
the current study, it is necessary to discuss the na-
ture and extent of audit risks in the charity sector
since these differ somewhat from those encoun-
tered in the private sector.
By law, charity trustees have similar responsibil-
ities to company directors (i.e. safeguarding assets,
annual reporting, compliance with relevant legisla-
tion and other regulations, and the prevention and
detection of fraud and error in their financial state-
ments by means of internal control systems).
Auditors* responsibilities are laid down in statute,
the main legislation being the Companies Acts
1985 and 1989. Charities Acts 1992 and 1993, and
The Charities (Accounts and Reports) Regulations
1995, apd in professional auditing standards issued
by the Auditing Practices Board. Litigation against
auditors in the private sector has become a major
concern for practising firms in recent years, evi-
denced by the 1997 £53m out-of-court settlement
paid by BDO Binder Hamlyn to ADT, a third party
plaintiff. The decision in the ADT case (ADT Ltd v
BDO Binder Hamlyn [December 1995], unreport-
ed), that an auditor may owe a duty of care to a
third party if he makes statements regarding the
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audited accounts to that party, caused audit firms
considerable anxiety, It seemed to go against the
landmark Caparo decision of 1990 (Caparo
Industries pic v Dickman and Others \ 1990|. I All
ER 568) which limited the auditor's duty of care
to shareholders as a body (i.e. not to individual
shareholders/investors, and certainly not to third
parties).
Case law suggests therefore that, provided the
auditor does not actually assume a duty of care to
a third party relying on audited financial state-
ments, his duty of care is restricted to those with
whom he has contracted to carry out the audit.
According to the Caparo decision, in order for an
individual to take legal action against an auditor,
there must firstly be proximity, in the charity sec-
tor there is no body of shareholders and therefore
no obvious party to sue an auditor for negligent
work. Gordon, Greenlee and Nitterhousc (1999),
in their useful overview of the regulation of US
charities, similarly affirm that, under US legisla-
tion, 'individual donors have no standing to bring
suit against charitable organisations in court'. A re-
view of UK case law (Sweet & Maxwell's Current
Lciw Cases Database, 1986 to date) failed to reveal
any cases involving auditors of charities being
sued; the vast majority of the cases dealt with is-
sues such as charitable status, property and tax
law. These observations suggest that litigation loss
may not be a key factor in charity audit risk,
though it is possible that the courts might be
prepared to extend the duty of care in the case of
voluntary/public sector bodies. However, 'reputa-
tional loss' may be an important consideration in
auditors" overall risk assessment.
The external audit of charities also presents risks
that are peculiar to the sector. The Auditing
Practices Board (APB) issued a Practice Note
(Practice Note 11, October 1996) in which they
identify five inherent risk factors requiring partic-
ular consideration by auditors of charity accounts.
First, the extent and complexity of regulation af-
fecting the voluntary sector is high, which increas-
es the risk that either trustees or directors may
unintentionally breach regulation. Tax rules are es-
pecially complex in this area as can be witnessed
by the extent of case law arising in recent years.
Second, the significance of donations and cash re-
ceipts presents problems for the auditor in terms of
vouching completeness of income and controls
over cash handling. Third, the uncertainty of future
income, whether the source is voluntary or grant-
based, creates difficulties for the auditor in assess-
ing going concern status. Fourth, the fact that
many charities rely on voluntary workers, fund-
raising on the charities' behalf from widespread
branches and retail outlets, is a significant risk fac-
tor. These volunteers are not controlled by the re-
porting entity in the way that employees are, and
their skills, competence and integrity cannot be
readily judged. Finally, the auditor must pay atten-
tion to the charity's governing documents to en-
sure that it is operating according to its objects,
that its trustees are complying with their designat-
ed authority, and that its financial activities are
compatible with any restrictions laid down in those
documents.
3.2. Charity audit fee model
The first objective in the present study is to de-
velop and estimate a model of charity audit fee de-
terminants. In common with previous studies, our
approach is to seek to explain the cross-sectional
variation of audit fees using an OLS regression
model. Much of the logic of previous work on pri-
vate sector companies is relevant in deriving our
model but it is also necessary to consider addition-
al potential explanatory variables to capture the
unique aspects of charifies. For ease of exposition,
the variables used in the basic charity audit fee
model are classified into five mutually non-exclu-
sive categories: auditee size, auditee complexity,
audit production costs, non-audit services and
audit difficulties and, thus, the general model spec-
ification can be summarised as:
audit fee = f (auditee size, auditee complexity, audit
production costs, non-audit services,
audit difficulties)
Table 2 (Panel A) provides a full listing of the spe-
cific proxy variables used, their definitions, vari-
able names, the expected coefficient signs and the
sources of the data.
3.2.}. Auditee size
A financial audit involves the review of the ac-
counting and internal control system and of the fi-
nancial transactions of the organisation. Larger
organisations will usually undertake more transac-
tions and have larger balance sheet assets and lia-
bilities, thereby requiring more audit work. Thus,
it is expected that larger charities will generally be
associated with larger audit fees. In private sector
studies, auditee size has often been proxied by
company total assets (e.g., Taylor and Baker, 1981;
Brinnetal, 1994:Firth, 1997) and occasionally by
total sales (e.g., Haskins and Williams, 1988; Chan
et al., 1993). in public sector studies of local gov-
ernment audits, population has been used as the
size proxy (e.g.. Rubin, 1988; Baber et al.. 1987).
The measurement of size in the charity sector is
not straightforward. First, most charities are by na-
ture service-providers so the link between output
and assets is not well defined. This link is further
obscured once the difference between the two
major types of charity is considered. Grant-making
charities tend to have relatively high asset levels,
but these are often investments of various types
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I I
U i—
C O
I I I I
k- L. I. l i
o o o o
o S o ^. i2X)3
Q ;
CQ CQ
O G
< <
ac QC
CQ
ac
03 P3
o o
< <
CC DC
03 03 03 CQ
I
u
1
Oft
o
«
3
rt
,
lo
g
ra
l
3
•oV
•c
re
st
o
E
3
CQ
"rt
O
eb
to
rs
-a
[to
tal
•yi
lyi
rt
to
ta
l
[st
oc
i
'—1
in
g
y.
'S
r 
Fu
nd
II
Tr
us
t;
1!
lla
i
k-
rtCu
u -
A
ct
 
o
11
w "O "O
•y. rt cO t .3
c
•a
-3i
• c
°"§
••J
xi-;^
p S o
r-i i-
^ ^ ^
^ C O
- s y =
5;.E ^ 5
,*!» __ ^ ^ ,
•3 rt rt rt
a c c 3
^ F h- H
.5" CD b
u !:: ^
G o o
. , i_ u, O v- ^ -j-,
« 5j W C ^ 1> i-
2i X X XX o
^ E £ ^ E E X
a 3 3 -1 3 3 oj
-^ Z Z Z Z Q
•o
rt
CO
a.
•
ai
sin
g
-a
c
^ 3
0
OJJ
ak
in
E
c
L I
tio
n
tit
u
c
U
tio
n
3
y.
C0
u
©
II
t
IS
©
•a
yi
C
Q
.£
y, 
w
he
n
 
b(
c
rt
C
E0
<y.
as
e 
i
••J
OJ
rt
>
rt
as
 
o
f
1 a
re
ip
a
c
•c
a.
0.1
ha
rit
i
u
D-
ist
 
20
 
sa
m
*_,
rt
w
ith
:to
rs
•u
u.
' -<—•
re
at
io
n
• 0
-0
jrt
 
a
n
Ct.
3
" 3
U
ea
rc
h
<u
id 
se
ie
nt
ifi
re
00
c
tr
ai
ni
io
n.
ea
t
3
-a
in
c
m
ed
i
an
d
"rt
ux;
lie
f
-a
ice
s 
a
se
rv
i
ia
l
0
in
rt
n 
ar
e;
0
c
in
 
le
ss
 
CO
y.
• ^
' u
s 
c
ha
as
e 
i
CJ
OJ
re
X
!y:
iv
iti
e:
rt
:/;
rt
i J
>
rt
E
le 
fr
o
0
c
3r
tio
n
 
o
f i
a.
c
Q .
1
ac
ti\
ou
c
• n
c3
'3
V -
E
.£
i>
E
G
; • •
pr
op
or
tio
t
1
>-•
.'ti
ac
tiv
=0
-
ra
i
• 0
e
qu
iv
al
en
0
^-^
y.
•
u
st
ee
u—
0
1_
U
X
3
z
1...
3
0
(A
rt
T3
II
<f
=%s
Q^
00
a\
^^v^
01
a
re
CQ
5
"O
o
u
rc
e
re
re
-0
i- II
^ -
AUTUMN 2()01 251
^ £
^o
O
g
5 1
a: tc
s
H
«
o
c
u
ha
rii
o
.A
c
3
O
lb
er
a l
e
o
'c
'Q.
o
c
"a
C o -5 fli _^ v:
1
3
- B
! "§
• - :^ S E
Bfl T3 ^ _
5 a "^
< I I I I
o o S o S
X H ^ g 9
J E
DO
CQ
O
S £
E n
O ^^
S O
>.<
to ^
O-S
CQ 2
252 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
and. therefore, are reasonably straightforward to
audit. By contrast, fund-raising charities have rel-
atively few assets but there are significant control
difficulties associated with funds raised. Given the
problem of using assets as the size measure, we
use total incoming resources (the closest charity
equivalent to company sales), while also recognis-
ing the major difference between grant-making
and fund-raising charities via a dummy variable
{type). This dummy takes the value of 1 if the char-
ity is fund-raising and 0 if grant-making so the
higher audit cost associated with the former will be
reflected in an expected positive coefficient. As
this dummy variable might more usefully be con-
sidered an indication of complexity we classify it
as such. To test whether the results are sensitive to
our choice of size measure, we also use measures
based on total assets and on total funds (i.e., the
'' They report a bivariate correlalion between sales (S) and
assets (A) of 0.98 but do nol report the results of any ftirthcr
diagnostic tests for multicollineurity. They merely assert that
"The tact that the slantlard errors [prestiniably toefficienls was
intended] on S and A in Table 3 are slalistically signitlcani at
an acceptable level suggests thai it (i.e.. tnulticollinearity) is
nol a serious problem". Further. Gregory and Collier (1996:20)
report having problems with multicollinearity when they used
the Pong and Whittington model.
"* A Mackinnon-While-Diividson (see Gtijarati. 1995; 265)
test of functional form rejected the linear model and aceepled
a log-linear model as potentially appropriate. Euriher evidence
from a Durbin-Watson test and the Ramsey RESET specifica-
tion test (see Gujarati. 1995: 462 ff.) confirmed the linear
model as inappropriate, but both log-linear and quadratic
models were acceptable. However, the level of heteroskedas-
ticity was much higher for the latter (as Pong and Whittington,
1994. conceded).
" A number of standard control variables relating to audit
risk are omitted from the models. Some of the omitted vari-
ables (e.g. "loss-making", return on investment) are not rele-
vant to non-profit organisations such as charities. Parallel
measures based on operating surplus/deficit would not capture
similar risk aspects since charities expect to report deficits.
Indeed a deficit could be seen as a measure of success in
achieving tbe aims of the charity! "Liquidity' measures, such
as current and quick ratios, are also omitted frotn our model
specification. In prior studies, the coefficients on these two
variables are typically found to be significantly positive and
negative, respectively. This suggests that either the two vari-
ables are collinear (quite likely given their construction) or
that they are proxying for something other ihan liquidity. For
exatTiple, the current ratio includes botb stock and debtors,
both of which are difficult to audit suggesting a positive rela-
tionship with audit fees. On the other hand, high liquidity
should reduce the likelihood of firm failure, (hereby reducing
audit risk and implying a negative relationship with audit fees.
In view of the difficulty in interpreting results for these vari-
ables, we have preferred to include stock and debtor measures
separately in our mixlel specification.
'-^  Many prior empirical papers have taken the square root
(or log) transformation of the number of subsidiaries.
Although this has not been adopted in the present paper, addi-
tional testing shows that the results are not sensitive to this. In
Model I a, for example, adoption of the square root proxy leads
to one very minor change in the significance of variables: tbe
t-statistic for SS changes from 1.98 to 1-9(3 giving significance
at the lO'yf rather than 5'^ level (in fact the p-value changes
from 0.049 to 0.059).
sum of restricted and unrestricted funds).
Audit costs are likely to benefit from economies
of scale since the cost of assessing the control sys-
tem is relatively fixed in nature and sampling the-
ory dictates that the cost of transaction testing need
not increase linearly with the number of transac-
tions. Thus, the use of a non-transformed size vari-
able may not adequately reflect the fee-size
relationship. Most previous studies have adopted a
log transfomiation of the size variable to reflect
this non-linearity. However. Pong and Whittington
(1994) argue against the use of a log transfortna-
tion of variables, such as size, without explicit
consideration of the underlying relationship. They
accommodate economies of scale by using a non-
transformed asset variable in addition to its
squared equivalent. They also recognise the diffi-
culties associated with each of the two main size
proxies by incorporating both sales and asset vari-
ables in their model. They argue that the resulting
multicollinearity between assets and sales does not
present a serious problem.*^ Consequently, we also
assess the usefulness of incorporating both vari-
ables in our models.
To establish the most appropriate functional
form of the size measure, preliminary tests of the
relationship between charity audit fees and total
incoming resources were undertaken.'" These con-
firmed that a linear model is inappropriate, but that
both a log-linear model and a quadratic model are
acceptable: results for both models are reported
later.
3.2.2. Auditee complexity
It is likely that the level of audit work will in-
crease with the level of auditee complexity. In pre-
vious private sector studies, proxies for
complexity have included the number of sub-
sidiaries, the number of industries in which the
company participates, the number of different
company locations and variables relating to asset
composition. To the extent that relevant parallel
proxies exist in the charity sector, they have been
used, and u number of proxies unique to the sector
have also been identified."
The parallel complexity proxies in the charity
sector are the number of trading subsidiaries
(.VH/W),'" the number of different significant areas
of activity Uliyers). the number of trading outlets
(outlets) and the number of branches (branch).
The equivalent asset composition proxies, indicat-
ing the importance of the relatively 'difficult to
audit' asset-classes stock and debtors, were tneas-
ured as the proportion of total assets represented
by debtors (deb) and by stock {stock).
Several unique dimensions of complexity in the
charity sector may impact on the level of audit
fees. First, the fundamentally different nature of
fund-raising and grant-tnaking charities was as-
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sessed by incorporating the npe binary variable
(discussed in the previous section): the cla.ssifica-
tion in Barings was adopted here.
Second, it can be hypothesised that a charity's
constitution might affect the work required of the
auditor and, consequently, the audit fee. This could
result from additional reporting requirements to
government or regulators, or perhaps from differ-
ing trustee (or equivalent) needs for audit assur-
ance. This was explored by categorising the
charity as a company, a trust, or one whose consti-
tution was set up by Act of Parliament or Royal
Charter. This split was incorporated using dummy
variables for the latter two categories (constT = I
if the charity is a trust. consfA = I if Act of
Parliament or Royal Charter), leaving company
status as the base case.'^ A priori, the expected
signs on these coefficients are difficult to predict.
While the diversity of activities within a charity
is one potential audit fee determinant (already
proxied by divers), the specific area of charitable
activity might also be important. This is analogous
to the argument supporting the use of industry
dutnmies in private sector audit fee studies (e.g.,
Simunic (1984) and Barkess and Simnett (1994)
both found evidence of significant industry fac-
tors). To as.sess this, classifications were extracted
from Barings and dichotomous variables con-
structed for the major areas of activity represented
in the sample charities. A charity with at least 50%
of its expenditure in a particular area of activity
was classified as having a major interest in that
area. Five areas of activity had at least 20 sample
charities with a major interest in the area, so were
considered for inclusion in the model. One of these
areas, "internationar. was strongly correlated with
another variable (oseas) and was excluded from
the model as the latter was considered more effec-
'•* The coefficieni on consiT measures the incremental audit
fee (log transformed) ft)r charities with a 'trusi' constitution
above the audit fee for the base case of ii charity with a 'com-
pany' constitution: a similar argument applies to consiA.
'"' It is possible that the linancial statements of housing
group chariiies may differ significantly from other charities
(e.g. the amount ol' land stock tnay be expected to be much
higher) and that this may affect some of the key ratios. The
sensitivity of the results to this was tested in two ways. First,
inclusion of an extra dummy variable far charities in this sub-
sector was incorporated in ihe basic model 1 la). The coeffi-
cient on this dummy w;is insignificant (t-stal - 0,56) and there
was a minor change in the significance of jiLst one of the con-
trol variables (divers, marginally ceased to be significant: p
value = 0,115), Second, the regression was re-estimated ex-
cluding all housing group charities: there were no changes in
variable significance. We are grateful to one of the referees for
drawing this point to our attention.
'^  A charity auditor suggested that the variety of different
sources of income also affects the level of audit fees. To Ihe
extent that charities in a particular sector have similar sources
of income, this aspect is proxied by ihe "area of activity'
dummy vatiables.
tive in capturing charities with significant overseas
involvement. Thus, four dummy variables repre-
senting major areas of activity were included in the
model; these were "culture, sport and recreation
(CSR)\ "education, training atid scientific research
(ETR)\ "health and medicine (//A/)" and "social
services and relief (SS)' .^'^ Charities within other
areas of activity acted as the base case.
Other aspects of charities" operations that may
itnpact on audit fees include involvement overseas,
significant trading activities, and the importance
of fund-raising activities.''^ Overseas involvement
(oseas) was measured dichotomously. taking a
value of 1 if there was any evidence of significant
overseas activity within the financial statements.
Trading activities are broadly incorporated in the
model through the variables "number of trading
subsidiaries' (suh^-) and "number of trading outlets'
[outlets). As these two variables are rather crude
indicators of trading activities, an additional vari-
able indicating the relative importance of trading
in generating income was also investigated. This
was measured as the proportion of total incoming
resources relating to gross trading activities
(trad%). Similarly, the binary variable (type) based
on Barings categorisation of charities as fund-rais-
ing or grant-making only crudely captures the im-
portance of fund-raising activities within a charity.
So, to capture more accurately the potential in-
creased audit costs associated with the difficulties
in control of fund-raising activities, an additional
continuous warmble fundr% was incorporated; this
measures the proportion of total incoming re-
sources relating to fund-raising. All three addition-
al variables (oseci.s, trud% and fundr%) are
expected to have positive coefficients.
Finally, it is possible that the number of trustees
(or equivalent) might affect audit risk. On one
hand, it could be argued that a larger number of
trustees might lead to more rigorous governance
and a commensurate reduction in audit risk. On the
other hand, a large trustee group might lead to
a reduction in each individual's perceived respon-
sibility and perhaps fewer meetings, thereby re-
sulting in weaker, less robust, organisational
governance. The number of trustees was captured
in a variable trust, whose expected sign is, a priori,
indeterminate.
3.2.3. Audit production costs
In common with private sector audits, two as-
pects of the audit process are expected to have an
effect on audit fees. The location of the audit staff
undertaking the audit will affect the costs of em-
ploying audit staff, with higher costs associated
with the London area. This is proxied by the office
location of the audit firm undertaking the audit as
indicated in the audit report. A dichotomous meas-
ure [audioc) is used taking the value I if the location
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was London and 0 if elsewhere, and a positive co-
efficient is expected.""
The majority of UK private sector companies
have either December or March year-ends, causing
considerable seasonality of audit work for audit
firms. It is hypothesised that audits performed
around this busy period will be more costly be-
cause of the increased demand for auditors' servic-
es. This potential 'busy season" factor is captured
by a dichotomous year-end variable (_v^ ) that has a
value of 1 if the year-end is in December. January.
March or April and 0 otherwise.
3.2.4. Non-audit services
Many private sector studies in the US (e.g.,
Simunic, 1984; Simon, 1985; Davis et al.; 1993).
in Australia (e.g.. Barkess and Simnett. 1994), in
Norway (Firth, 1997} and in the UK (Ezzamel et
al., 1996) have observed a significant positive as-
sociation between audit fees and payments to au-
ditors for non-audit services. Several explanations
for this positive relationship have been proposed,
including knowledge spillovers between audit and
non-audit services, but a consensus view has not
emerged. The association in the charity sector is
investigated by inclusion of a continuous variable.
the fees payable to auditors for non-audit services
(nasfee), in the audit fee model.
3.2.5. Audit difficulties
A qualified audit report, or a long lag between
year end and audit report completion, often re-
flects difficulties in the auditee organisation (e.g.,
fraud or going-concern problems), potentially in-
creasing audit risk. It is expected that this would
lead to an increased audit fee either because addi-
tional audit work is required, or to reflect an ele-
ment of insurance premium to compensate the
auditor for the additional risk. Positive coefficients
"• The location of ihe charily head office, taken from
Barings, was investigated as an alternative proxy since a sim-
ilar variable had been used in a previous study (Brinn et al..
1994). This was strongly correlated with audloc so was ex-
cluded from the model.
'"' As a sensitivity check, Ihe basic model (Model la) was
also re-estimated excluding 18 charities with large audit de-
lays, taken as longer than a 95*^ one-sided confidence interval
(240 days). There were no changes in variable significance.
'" This somewhat lax attitude to audit reporting demonstrat-
ed by over \{)7f of the sample charities provides another illus-
tration of relatively poor control procedures. The basic model
(Model la) was re-estimated including a dummy variable for
those charities with an unsigned audit report. The coefficient
on this dummy was insignificant (t-stat -0.12) and there were
no changes in the significance of" other variables.
'^ Mean value imputation is a strategy for dealing with
missing values withoui loss of observations (Little and Rubin.
1989). As a sensitivity check, the basic model (Model la) was
re-estimated excluding all 22 charities with an undated audit
report. There were three minor changes in the significance of
control variables: divers and slock ceased to be significant,
and the significance of trad'Tc reduced to 5%.
on proxies for these two variables have been found
in previous studies of private sector firms (e.g.,
for audit delay: Chan et al., 1993; Ezzamel et al.,
1996). However, in charity audits, there is usually
less pressure to complete the audit within a short
period after the accounting year-end. Thus, for
charities, a greater audit 'delay" might also arise
because the audit firm had been able to schedule
the audit to coincide with 'slack" periods thereby
benefiting from reduced marginal staff costs. This
would suggest a negative relationship between
audit fee and delay. The impact on the level of
audit fees of a qualified audit report, here taken as
any non-standard features in the audit report, is as-
sessed using a dummy variable (opinion). The
potential Impact of audit delay Is explored by in-
cluding a continuous audit delay variable (delay),
measured as the number of days between the year-
end and the date of the audit report.''' Interestingly,
the audit report was undated (and. with one excep-
tion, also unsigned) for 22 of the sample chari-
ties;'*^ the mean audit delay of the other charities
was imputed for these charities.''*
3.3. Experimental variables concerning auditor
premia
3.3.1. Big Six brand name premium
Once a basic model of the determinants of char-
ity audit fees has been determined, the presence of
auditor premiums can be assessed. Four specific
hypotheses are investigated. Hypothesis one inves-
tigates the presence of a large firm audit premium
in the charity sector. The audit market structure
within the sector is especially useful for exploring
this issue since Big Six auditors do not dominate
the market to the extent that is true for the private
sector. In particular, none of the Big Six can be de-
scribed as having expertise in the sector, based on
the usual definition of expertise indicated by 10%
market share (e.g., Palmrose. 1986a; Craswell et
al., 1995). Thus, any observed premium can be at-
tributed to brand name rather than any specific
sector expertise.
The hypothesis can be stated in alternative form
as:
Hj: The brand name of large audit firms (the Big
Six) is rewarded by a fee premium above
non-Big Six firms in the charity sector.
To test for the existence of a large firm audit pre-
mium, a binary variable (BIG6) to identify those
charities that were audited by one of the Big Six
auditors is incorporated in the regression (Model I
variants).
If evidence of a premium is found, a fmer level
of detail can be investigated to see whether there is
any diversity in reward amongst the Big Six. This
leads to the second hypothesis:
H^: Individual Big Six firms are rewarded by a
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brand name fee premium above non-Big Six
firms in the charily sector.
This is tested by incorporating dummy variables
for each of the five Big Six firms (KPMG, CL DT,
EY, PW) that are active in the charity sector
(Models 4 to 6).
3.3.2. Specialist premium
While Big Six auditors do not dominate the
charity sector market, they still command relative-
ly large market shares (e.g. KPMG audits 6.4% of
the Barings 'top 3000"). Ideally, to assess the rela-
tive importance of brand name and industry spe-
cialisation, a joint analysis would be applied. The
approach usually adopted to carry out this joint
analysis is to incorporate a 'specialist" variable in
addition to the Big Six dummy variable, with an
interactive term Big Six*"specialist' to see if Big
Six specialists earn a premium over non-Big Six
specialists. Unfortunately, there is likely to be sig-
nificant collinearity between 'specialist" and Big
Six variables. This can lead to increased standard
errors for the coefficient estimates, tending to re-
duce statistical significance, and also the coeffi-
cients can be more sensitive to sample data, to the
extent that coefficient signs can change on intro-
duction of the collinear variable(s) (Gujarati,
1995:325-335).
In the current study there was indeed significant
collinearity between the Big Six and 'specialist'
"^ For example, in the 'All Charities' model (Model la) ihe
coefficieni on BIG6 is ().0%3 (t-slat ^ 1.26) when thi.s variable
is included wiihoul the spt'cialisi variable. Including the spe-
cialisr variable instead oi' BIG6 gave a coefficient estimate of
0.0014 (t-stal= 1.80, significant al the 10% level). When bolh
variables were incorporated together, without an interactive
term, the coefficient for BIG6 changed sign to -0.0871 (t-stat
= -0.71) and for speviutis! became insignificant, even though
it increased in size to 0.0020 (t-stal = 1.62). Inclusion of an in-
teractive term as well gave coefficients of -0.1442 (t-stat =
-0.53) for BIG6. of 0.0018 (t-stat = 1.17) for specialisl and of
O.(X)O6 (t-stat = 0.23) for the interactive lerm B/G6*spenalisl.
For Fund-raising charities (Model 3), the coefficient on BIG6
included on its own is 0.1701 (t-slat - 2.00, significant at the
5% level). Including the specialisl variable instead of B!G6
gave a coefficient estimate of 0,0019 (t-stat- 2,36, significant
at the 59c level). When both variables were incorporated to-
gether, without an interactive term, the coefficient for B/G6
changed sign to -0.0200 (t-stat = -0.13) and for specialisl be-
came insignificant, even though it increased in size lo 0.0021
(t-stat = 1.35), Inclusion of an interactive term as well gave co-
efficients of 0.1716 (t-,slat = 0.60) for S/G6. of 0,0031 (t-sta!
= 1.76, significant ai the 10% level) for specialisl and of
-0,0023 (t-stat = -0,84) for the interactive term BlG6*spe-
cialisi. Collinearily between BIG6 and specialisl variables
(and the interactive term) was evident in both seis of models:
relatively high condition numbers associated wiih bigh vari-
ance proportions were observed (Belsley et al,, 1980, Chapter
3), For example, in the 'All Charities' models, a condition
number of 12,8 was associated with variance proportions of
0.83 and 0,91 for BIC6 and xpecialisr. respectively. With the
interactive term included, the condition number of 26.52 was
associated with variance proportions of 0.70 (B/G6). 0,34
{specialisl) and 0.86 {BIG6*specialist). respectively.
variables. Introduction of the 'specialist' variable
changed the sign of the Big Six coefficient to neg-
ative and reduced the significance of both vari-
ables.-" This means that sensible interpretation of
the coefficients on these variables was impossible.
In view of this, an alternative approach was adopt-
ed, in which separate regressions were estimated
for Big Six and non-Big Six audit firms: this
method has been used in previous studies of audit
specialist premia {e.g., Craswell et al., 1995:
310-311). In the separate Big Six regression
model (details not reported here), there was no ev-
idence of a fee premium for expertise in Big Six
firms. This is not too surprising, given that none of
the Big Six firms has a particular comparative ex-
pertise/specialism over the other Big Six firms.
Specialism in non-Big Six firms is discussed fur-
ther in the next section.
3.3.3. Non-Big Six specialist premium
The reduced role of Big Six auditors in the char-
ity sector allows pricing by non-Big Six audittirs to
be investigated, and, in particular, whether there is
any evidence of reward for expertise or specialism
in the sector. Certainly, some non-Big Six audit
firms (e.g. Binder Hamlyn, Horwath Clark
Whitehill) market themselves on the basis of spe-
cific expertise in the charity sector (see adverts on
pages 1.4, 8.7, 8.19 and others, in Barings (1998)).
but whether this is rewarded in audit pricing is un-
clear.
Cullinan (1998: 49-50) discusses various alter-
native perspectives on audit pricing and the poten-
tial impact of market share conditioned on audit
expertise. If there are no perceived differences in
audit expertise, the impact of higher market share
will depend on the approach to pricing adopted by
firms. Cost-based pricing would yield lower audit
fees as a result of economies of scale reducing per-
client costs. If the audit market is characterised by
a high degree of concentration, the few firms with
a dominant market share could have monopolistic
or oligopolistic pricing power, leading to higher
audit fees under market-based pricing. If there are
perceived (and actual) differences in sector expert-
ise, this will tend to increase overall audit firm
costs and the effect on per-client costs will depend
on the number of clients in the sector. The impact
on audit fees in a cost-based pricing environment
is indeterminate. In a market-based pricing envi-
ronment, greater perceived (and actual) expertise
results in higher value audits, for which clients
would be willing to pay more since this may re-
duee agency costs. Thus, higher market share is a
signal of greater expertise, which should result in
higher audit fees. As market concentration is much
lower in the charity sector than in the private sec-
tor company audit market, there is less likelihood
of monopolistic/oligopolistic pricing by a few
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market leaders. Consequently, observation of a fee
premium is stronger evidence that clients are will-
ing to pay higher audit fees to firms with perceived
expertise in the sector.
Thus, the third hypothesis focuses on non-Big
Six firms (where brand name reputation is much
lower) and assesses the impact of expertise on
audit pricing in the charity sector:
H^: Non-Big Six audit firms with expertise are
rewarded by a fee premium above other non-
Big Six firms in the charity sector.
Expertise is proxied by market share, measured as
the number of charities within the top 2.620 that
are audited by the firm.-' A variable {specialist)
representing the audit firm's mar]<.et share is incor-
porated in a regression based on charities audited
by non-Big Six audit firms (Model 7).
If evidence of a premium for expertise is found,
a finer level of detail can be investigated to see
whether there is any diversity in reward amongst
the non-Big Six market ]eaders in the charity sec-
tor. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
H^: Individual non-Big Six audit firms with ex-
pertise are rewarded by a fee premium above
other non-Big Six firms in the charity sector.
Market leadership was based on the ranking in
Barings according to the total number of charities
audited, and the total audit fees charged (details in
Table 1, Panel A). Five non-Big Six firms rank in
the top nine on at least (me of these two measures
and binary variables are incorporated in the re-
gression for these firms (Model 8). Table 2 (Panel
B) provides definitions of the experimental vari-
ables, their names, expected coefficient signs and
the sources of the data.
3.4. Procedures for cotnparison between charity
and company audit fees
The general regression model described above
seeks to explain the factors within the charity sec-
tor that contribute to the level of audit fees
charged. A second important issue is to consider
the impact, if any. that the fundamental charitable
nature itself might have on audit fees. Anecdotal
evidence, prior expectations and preliminary
views at the data gathering stage of the current
study all suggest that charity audit fees are lower
than those paid by private sector non-charitable
companies. There are at least three reasons why
this might be the case. First, the risks involved in
auditing a charity are certainly different to. and
-' An alternative market share variable, based on total audii
fees earned in Ihe charity sector (also taken from Baring.s,
1998). was incorporated with similar (unreported) results.
-- An illustration of tbis was noied during data collection.
Tbe charity 'Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales'
reported that 'Ihe auditors waived their fee for 1996".
might well be less than, those of a non-charitable
company audit (see Section 3.1 above). Lower
risks should lead to lower costs for the audit firm
and commensurately lower audit fees are expected
if cost-based pricing is followed. Second, it seems
likely that charity audits might be seen by the au-
diting profession as a way of supporting the chari-
table sector, of 'giving back" to society. Thus, a
reduced level of audit fees would represent a form
of altruism; in effect, a charitable donation is being
made by the audit firm to the charity.-- Third, there
is the possibility that a lower 'market rate' for
charity audits might encourage audit firms to use
]ess experienced staff and reduce audit time in try-
ing to minimise losses incurred. The loH'er audit
quality implied by this is of great concern in view
of the importance of accountability in maintaining
confidence in the charity sector, and of the key role
that the independent audit plays in this.
To assess these alternatives, it is necessary to
have some 'hard* evidence on the relative size of
audit fees in the charity sector. To our knowledge,
this issue has not been systematically investigated.
Thus our final hypothesis is:
Hji Charities pay lower audit fees than similar-
sized private sector companies.
To allow for different organisational sizes, the
basic measure adopted for comparison is audit fee
scaled by organisation size. i.e.. audit fee per
pound of revenue, with revenue measured as total
incoming resources (charities) and total sales
(companies); two alternative scale tneasures. total
assets and total funds, are also used to check sen-
sitivity. The usefulness of this ratio measure de-
pends upon the assumption that marginal audit
costs are constant across the whole range of com-
pany and charity sizes. Its limitation is that it does
not recognise the expected economies of scale in
the audit process. If the size distributions of com-
panies and charities are similar, scale economies
will not cause a major problem. However, as we
find that their size distributions differ significant-
ly, it is necessary to control further for size to ef-
fect a valid audit fee comparison. Initially, a
simple size control was investigated by selecting
only the subset of companies that fell within the
size range (based on revenue) of our charity sam-
ple. However, even within this truncated range the
distributions of companies and charities are signif-
icantly different. There is a much larger concentra-
tion of small charities, which would tend to
increase the observed mean 'audit fee per pound of
revenue" measure for charities. This leads to a bias
against the hypothesis that charity audit fees will
be lower.
One way to address this problem would be to
match each charity within the sample with a single
company of similar size. However, this has the
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limitation that the matched company may have
idiosyncratic audit risks. An alternative approach,
preferred here, is effectively to match each charity
with an average similar-sized company (based on
total revenue). This is achieved by using a boot-
strapping method to control for the scale
economies in the audit process. This "manufac-
tures' a closer size-distribution match between the
sample of companies and charities within the sim-
ilar size range. From the existing company sample,
a stratified random sample was taken to mirror the
distributional properties of the charity sample.
Effectively, each charity was matched with a ran-
domly chosen company from the group of compa-
nies of similar size and the mean audit fee for the
charity and company samples was computed. This
sampling process was repeated 1,000 times to re-
duce the sampling bias that would be introduced if
just one such sample were chosen. This enables a
distribution of audit fee sample means to be de-
rived, and both the mean and standard error of the
distribution to be estimated (Mooney and Duval,
1993).
-' Almost identical results (not reported here) were oblained
for a sample ba,sed on selecting every alternate charity in the
top 5(X) (n- 176). In tbis model one of the nine significant
variables in Model la ceased to be significant, namely SS with
a very marginally insignificant p-vaiue of 0.101, Two of the
other eight control variables increased slightly in signitlcance
{(tivers to 5'7f. and stock lo I'ii ). The coefficient on the exper-
imental variable BIG6 increased to 0.1184 but remained in-
significant.
-** Of the charity sample, 84% had year-ends in 1997 and a
further 14% had year-ends in the following three months (to
31/03/98). so 98% had year-ends in tbe 15-month period
31/12/96 to 31/3/98 inclusive. The Barings publication dead-
line means that some of its data, panicularly quantitative fi-
nancial dala collected from financial statements, is not from
sources time-coincident wiib those used for the current study.
For our charity sample. 58% of the financial statements used
were coincident with those used in Barings; the rcsi were more
recent than ihose used in Barings by one year (37%). two
years (4%) or three years (1%). The majority of data items
(about 75%) used in tbe currenl study were extracted directly
from tbe accounts provided to us by tbe charities. With one ex-
ception (auditor market share), the few data items extracted
from Barings (e.g.. areas of charitable activity, grant-mak-
ing/fund-raising categorisation and auditor market share) are
of a categorical nature. All of these items are likely fo be rela-
tively siable over lime, so the exaci matching in terms of year-
end is not critical. Furthermore, charities provide additional
data lo Barings (Barings. I998;6,III) so any non-financial data
included therein is likely to be based on more reccni informa-
lion than Ibe available financial statements. While Ibe non-co-
incidence in sources for some data items may introduce a
source of error into tbe estimated models, we do not believe
that ibese errors could be significant.
'-'' Tbis excludes finiincial companies and investment tmsls.
Also, the fact that a proportion of sample charity year-ends fall
in the tlrst three m(inths of tbe next calendar year (see footnote
30) may introduce a small bias in the audit fee comparison.
However, inflationary audit fee increases mean tbai this is
likely to be a bias af^aiitsi {]nd'ing that charities pay lower audit
fees than companies.
4. Sample selection
Data from the UK was used, as legislation in this
country requires the disclosure of key variables, in
particular, fees for audit and non-audit services
paid to the auditor. The sample was selected from
the top 500 charities identified in the 1998 edition
of Baring Asset Management Top 3000 Charities
(Barings, 1998). This covers a wide variety of dif-
ferent types of charity such as the British Council,
Wellcome Trust, Oxfam, the Tate Gallery, training
organisations (e.g.. Construction Industry Training
Board), and some housing associations (e.g.,
Notting Hill Housing Group). Entries are pub-
lished in respect of the top 2,0(X) charities, but as a
charity can qualify for inclusion on any of three
criteria (income, expenditure or funds) approxi-
mately 3,000 are published in each edition; in the
1998 edition there are 2,620 charities included.
Our objective was to achieve a sample that was
representative of the population of major UK char-
ities. Given the economic importance of larger
charities, all of the top lCK) charities ranked by in-
come were included in our sample.-' In recogni-
tion of the greater homogeneity expected in
charities ranked between 101 and 500, every alter-
nate charity was selected to give, overall, a strati-
fied sample of 300 charities from the top 500.
Based on charity income reported in Barings
(1998), the top 500 charities accounted for ap-
proximately 76% of the total income of £13.2bn of
the top "3.000' charities. This suggests thai our
sample should capture audit fee determinants for a
large and important part of the charity sector.
However, it does not cover the large number of
relatively small charities in the sector.
Most of the data items required for the study are
not included in Barings (1998), so a considerable
amount of data had to be collected manually from
the charities' annual reports and accounts (see
Table 2 for details). In June 1998, a letter was sent
to each of the charities selected, requesting a copy
of their latest annual report and accounts, with foi-
low-up letters sent in July 1998. All replies re-
ceived by September 1998 were included in the
study.-"*
For the comparison of audit fees paid by compa-
nies and charities, company data for 1997 year-
ends were sourced from the UKQI list of industrial
and commercial companies on Datastream.-^ The
particular data items extracted were audit fees
(Datastream item: 118), total sales (104), total as-
sets (392) and shareholders' capital plus reserves
(307). Companies whose revenue fell outside the
observed charity size range (based on total incom-
ing resources) were eliminated. Thus, 236 large
companies with sales above £440m and 30 small
companies with sales below £300,000 were elimi-
nated to leave 1.084 companies.
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Table 3
Sample summary
Rank in Barings 'Top 3000'
Selection basis
Possible sample size
Reason for exclusion
Accounts not received from charity
Audit fee = £nil/ other reason'
Final sample
lypes of charity in final sample
Fund-raising
Grant-making
Total
Types of audit firm in final sample
Fund-raising
Grant-making
Total
Notes
l-IOO
all
100
25
4
71
48
23
71
BIG SIX
No %
62 43.7
26 38.2
88 41.9
1. Other reasons for exclusion were: accounts denominated in
accounts submitted (2); fee requestec (2).
Wl~500
every other one
200
58
3
139
94
45
139
Non-BIG SIX
No %
80 56.3
42 61.8
122 58.1
a foreign currency (1);
Total
300
83
7
210
142
68
210
Total
No
142
68
210
out-of-date or
%
100.0
27.7
2.3
70.0
67.6
32.4
100.0
%
100.0
100.0
lt)0.0
incorrect
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides a descriptive summary of the
210 charities in the final sample. From this table it
can be seen that 83 charities (28%) failed to pro-
vide accounts, a level of non-response which is
broadly similar to the 19% obtained by Hyndman
(1990). All charities are required by law"*^  to make
a copy of the accounts available to anyone re-
questing them, though they may charge a reason-
able sum to cover copying and postage costs.
Thus, a significant proportion of charities failed to
comply with the law. This is a disturbing indict-
ment of the basic system of governance in the
charitable sector, especially given that all of the
-^ For incorporated charities, and unincorporated charities
in England and Wales, Section 47 of the Charities Act 1993
(Part Vll refers. Equivalent regulations for unincorporated
charities in Scotland are included in Ihe Law Reform (MPS)
Act 1990 and the Charities Accounts (Scotland) Regulations
1992.
•'' Barings express some concern over their classitlcation.
'In charily parlance, the expression '"grant maker" is epito-
mised by a foundation exclusively engaged in making grants,
mainly to other charities, out of income earned on its invest-
ments. There are many charities which t"it Ihis description pre-
cisely. However, there are a considerahle number of otliers
making grants in the normal course of their activities which do
not In the circumstances, there are no clearly defined and
generally accepted criteria by which to judge whether certain
charities should or should not be described as grant makers.
Wherever possible, charities are categorised in accordance
with how they perceive themselves' (Barings. 1998: 6.II).
Thus, the dichotomous classification must be viewed with
caution.
sample charities are relatively large.
Three tests for response bias were performed on
the full complement of 300 charities. First, the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test was
used to compare responding and non-responding
charities on the basis of size (measured as total in-
come, as reported in Barings, 1998). The hypothe-
sis that the two groups have been drawn from the
same population could not be rejected (even at the
10% significance level). Second, the proportion of
grant-making and fund-raising charities in both
groups was compared and found to be identical.
Third, the date of the most recent accounts avail-
able to Barings for its 1998 statistical compilation
(Barings, 1998) was examined. Fight (9%) of the
non-respondent charities had out-of-date accounts
(dated prior to 1 January 1996. i.e.. more than 30
months prior to our investigation). Taken together.
these results suggest that response bias is unlikely
to be a serious threat to the validity of the results,
though charities with 'old accounts' (and their spe-
cial circumstances) are perhaps not adequately
represented. Unfortunately, data availability is a
constraint in many empirical studies that use pub-
licly available sources.
Of the 210 usable responses. Table 3 shows that
142 (68%) were classified by Barings as fund-rais-
ing and 68 (32%) as grant-making charities.-^ It
also demonstrates that Big Six audit firms were re-
sponsible for 42% of the audits in our sample. This
percentage is higher than the overall Big Six mar-
ket share of 25% reported in Table 1. and reflects
the greater preponderance of Big Six firms en-
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Table 4
Summary statistics of variables (n = 210)
Audit fees
audfee (£000)
Inaudfee
Audiiee size
totir (£000)
assei (£000)
totf (£000)
Intotir
Inasset
Inlotf
Auditee complexity
subs
divers
outlets
branch
deb
stock
type
constT
constA
CSR
ETR
HM
SS
oseas
trad%
fundr%
trust
Mean
25.649
2.860
27.199
113,594
99,521
9.617
9,900
9.314
0.995
I.IOO
10.06
36.18
0.II2
0.013
0.676
0.233
0.214
0.138
0.110
0.248
0.152
0.167
0.257
0.208
19.39
Audit production costs
audloc
ye
Non-audit services
nasfee (£000)
Audit difficulties
delay (days)
opinion
Auditor premium
BIG6
KPMG
CL
DT
EY
PW
specialist
BH
GT
HCW
BDO
NAO
0.552
0.805
7.187
140.5
0.033
0.419
0.095
0.086
0.105
0.038
0.095
78.1
0.076
0.038
0.033
0.024
0.062
Median
18
2.89
13.205
15.348
10.609
9.488
9.639
9.270
0
1
0
0
0.053
0.002
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.037
16
1
1
0
134
0
0
()
()
0
0
0
68
0
0
0
0
0
Min
0.6
-0.511
313
673
1
5.746
6.512
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-O.(X}6
0
3
0
0
0
23
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
[
0
0
0
0
0
***. **. and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%
Max
263
5.572
433.864
8.583,934
8,137,613
12.98
15.965
15.912
8
4
585
2,000
0.733
0.365
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
21.534
0.989
150
1
i
89
513
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
167
1
1
1
1
1
Standard
deviation
29.122
0.872
44.672
643,232
611.760
1.044
1.587
2.072
1.446
0.397
62.59
186.76
0.144
0.039
1.579
0.298
15.87
14.361
65.0
54.8
Skew
4.28
-0.07
5.54
11.79
11.78
0.12
0.55
-0.52
2.23
4.56
7.14
7.56
2.16
6.32
12.17
1.32
3.84
3.01
1.93
0.15
Kurt
26.83
0.85
40.86
149.18
148.31
1.16
0.50
2.29
6.56
22.68
53.45
67.30
4.62
46.09
160.74
0.31
24.18
10.23
7.41
-1.18
and 10% levels respectively (two-tail).
Corr with
audfee
1.00
0.80 ***
0.60 ***
0.35 ***
0.34 ***
0.61 ***
0.48 ***
0.42 ***
0.26 ***
0,01
0.15 **
0.13 *
-0.04
-0.03
0.10
-0.06
0.27***
-0.04
0.01
-0.09
0.21***
0.21***
-0.03
0.07
0.20 ***
0.25***
0.00
0.37 ***
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.05
-0.09
0.00
0.18***
0.38 ***
-0.05
-0.07
-0.03
0.05
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gaged in the audit of larger charities, which form
the basis of our sample.
Table 4 provides summary statistics for each of
the variables, including non-transformed size vari-
ables. Audit fees ranged from £600 to £263,000
with a mean of £25.649. Charity size, based on
total incoming resources Uotir), ranged from a low
of just £313,000-*^ to a high of £433.9m. and aver-
aged £27.2m. As in previous studies on private
sector companies, the correlation of 0.60 between
audit fees and size is quite strong, suggesting that
size is a major determinant of charity audit fees.
Further, the positively skewed and leptokurtic na-
ture of both audit fees and size encourage the use
of transformed variables to improve their distribu-
tional properties. The alternative measure of size
based on total assets {as.set) covers a very wide
range up to an extremely large £8.584m. and is
less strongly correlated with audit fees (correlation
coefficient = 0.35); similar observations relate to
the total funds variable itotf). The wide range and
relatively low correlation for these two size meas-
ures reflects the important difference in the nature
and level of assets between fund-raising and grant-
making charities and is the major reason lor choos-
ing total incoming resources as the most
appropriate size proxy.
For the binary variables, the 'mean' value repre-
sents the proportion of charities that possess the
particular characteristic. For example, the mean
value of 0.676 for type shows that 67.6% of the
charities were in the fund-raising classification,
leaving 32.4% as grant-making. The constitution
variables indicate that 23.3% are trusts [amstT).
21.4% were set up by Act of Parliament or Royal
Charter [constA) and, therefore, the remaining
55.3% are charitable companies. The 'health and
medicine" variable (//A/) shows that almost 25% of
the sample charities were significantly involved in
this area of activity and that this represents the
most common area. On average, gross trading
(trad%) accounts for approximately 26%' of in-
coming resources, but this relatively large propor-
tion needs to be interpreted with care. First, the
mean is heavily distorted by one or two major out-
-* The total income of the smallest charily in our "top 500'
sampling frame according to Barings was £4.7m. Our deflni-
tioii »>r lotai incoming resources is slightly different and com-
poneni deiails were e\iracted directly from ihe financial
statements rather than Barings. These differences mean ihat a
small number of charilies (approximately 12) would not be
classified within the top 500 based on our measure. However,
these charities have been retained within our sample.
-'' The one major outlier of .'il.^ days related lo a charity
whose charitable status was under investigation by the Inland
Revenue; one further charity had a delay of 471 days. These
are the only two sample charities with delays beyond Ihe 10-
month time period by which annual reports must be filed with
the Charity Commission and/or with Companies House (S45.
The Charities (Accounts and Reports! Regulations 1995 (SI
IW5 No. 2724} and S.244( I) of the Companies Act).
hers (the maximum trad% value of 21.53 implies
that gross trading represented 2153% of total in-
coming resources in one particular charity), and so
the median of 0% may be more representative.
This more elosely reflects the fact that only 94 of
the 210 charities (45%) undertook trading activi-
ties. Second, further analysis of the basic data re-
veals that the net contribution frotn trading (i.e.,
after deducting trading expenses) accounts for just
5.4% of total incoming resources, on average.
Further points to note from the summary statis-
tics are;
• audloc shows that 55.2% of the audit firms were
London-based.
• ye indicates that a large proportion (80.5%) of
charity year-ends are in the audit 'busy-season'
around December and March, implying that
charities have probably not chosen their year-
ends in order to fit in with auditor slack periods.
• nasfee has a significant positive correlation with
audit fees and a mean value of £7,187 represent-
ing 28% of audit fees. Further analysis showed
that 44% of the charities reported non-zero fees
for non-audit services with just 7% reporting
nasfee higher than audit fees. This contrasts with
the UK company results of Ezzamel et al. (1996)
who found that non-audit services represent a
much higher proportion of audit fees (87%), that
93% of their sample of companies had non-zero
nasfee, with 44% reporting higher nasfee than
audit fees. Non-audit services are apparently
much less important in the charity sector.
• delay has a mean of 140 days implying a period
of about 4i/2 months between year-end and audit
report signing.-'^ This compares with mean de-
lays of between 53 and 96 days reported for pri-
vate sector companies in various international
studies (see Carslaw and Kaplan. 1991: 22, and
references therein).
• the specialist variable is significantly correlated
with audit fee. suggesting that sector expertise
might be rewarded with a fee premium. Of the
individual audit firm variables. Binder Hamlyn
(BH) shows a significant positive correlation
with audit fee size, suggesting the existence of a
premium to one of the market leaders in the sec-
tor. Deloitte Touche {DT) carried out the most
audits (10.5%).
5.2. Charity audit fee model
As expected, the bivariate correlations suggest
that the major determinant of audit fees is the size
of the charity (with a correlation of 0.60). Other
potentially important factors (indicated by signifi-
cant coiTelations at the 5%. two-tailed, level) in-
clude the number of trading subsidiaries isuhs:
0.26), the number of trading outlets (outlets: 0.15).
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the constitution of the charity when set up by Act
of Parliament or Royal Charter (constA: 0.27),
principal area of activity in social services and re-
lief {SS: 0.21). significant involvement overseas
(oseas: 0.21), the number of trustees (tmsi: 0.20).
the location of the audit firm {audloc: 0.25) and
the fee paid to the auditor for non-audit services
{nasfee: 0.37). However, as virtually all of these
are also significantly correlated with size ilntotir).
the outcome of the multivariate analysis is not ea.sy
to predict. One further observation from the full
correlation matrix (not reported) is that, apart from
high correlations between alternative size proxies,
none of the other correlations between independ-
ent variables is particularly high (the highest is
0.37). This suggests that multicollinearity may not
normally be a serious problem in the regression
model.
5.2.1. Basic model
The OLS multivariate regression results for the
basic model and the full sample of charities (n =
210) are reported in Table 5 (Model la).^" This
model uses log transformed total incoming re-
sources (Inl(Hir) as the size proxy.
The results for Model la confirm size (lutotir) as
the major audit fee determinant, with a highly sig-
nificant t-ratio of 9.01. The positive coefficient of
0.4739 implies that, ceteris parihus. audit fees in-
crease approximately with the square root of total
incoming resources, consistent with many previ-
ous private sector studies (see summary in Chung
and Lindsay. 1988: Table 11). Of the seven other
variables that were significantly correlated with
audfee (see Table 4). only three {subs, audloc and
nasfee) are confirmed as significant determinants
in the multivariate model (at the 1% level). Two
further variables are significant at the 1% level
{type and trad%), two at the 5% level (stock and
SS) and one at the 10% level (divers).
The results suggest that a number of general or-
ganisational characteristics, in addition to charac-
teristics unique to the charity sector, are associated
with differences in eharity audit fee levels. In com-
mon with private sector studies, the number of
trading subsidiaries {subs) and the proportion of
total assets represented by year-end stock {stock)
-"^ ' Notwiihstanding ihe uni-directional allernalive hypothe-
ses for approximalely half of the variables, all significance
levels iti Tables 5 and 6 are reported using the more conserva-
tive two-tail tests. All procedures were carried out tising the
SHAZAM v8.() econometrics program.
'^ This arjiument was confirmed by one of the charity audi-
tors who provided comments on the draft paper: 'SocUd serr-
ices/relief charities are often invoheil wiih rheir local
aitlhorilies in one way or another, and this tends lo bring in
Audit Commission rec/uirenieni.s that add to the cost of their
statutory aiidil!' Another audilor suggested that social servic-
es charities tend to employ a relatively large number of staff:
this increases audit risk, audit work and audit fees.
are positively associated with audit fees. These are
consistent with, respectively, the additional audit
work to meet statutory requirements and the un-
certainties in valuing and confirming the valuation
of stock. The significant negative coefficient on
the diversity measure {divers) is contrary to expec-
tation (but see later result for fund-raising sub-
sample). However, the coefficient estimate may be
somewhat unreliable as the divers variable is found
to be significantly collinear with size measures.
The dummy variable type seeks to capture the
fundamentally different nature of fund-raising and
grant-making charities, with the positive coeffi-
cient implying that the greater complexity and
control difficulties of the former group are reflect-
ed in higher audit fees. The form of a charity's
constitution (company, trust etc.) docs not seem to
impact on audit fees. Generally, the principal area
of activity of a charity does not affect audit fees
except for those charities within the "social servic-
es and relief sector (dummy variable SS), which
have higher audit fees. As suggested earlier, this
might reflect additional reporting or audit require-
ments imposed by the fund-providers as a condi-
tion of funding.*' The relative importance of
trading activities in generating income itrad%) is a
significant audit fee determinant, in line with ex-
pectations, but the relative importance of tund-
raising activities is not.
The significantly positive coefficient on audloc
suggests that, as expected, the higher audit pro-
duction costs incurred by London-based auditors
are passed on to charities in higher audit fees.
However, there is no evidence of additional fees
related to audit firm busy periods {ye) or short
audit delays {delay). These observations are con-
sistent with audit firms seeking to minimise in-
creased production costs by scheduling charity
audits in slack periods. A non-standard audit report
(opinion) does not appear to have a significant
impact on audit fees.
As in previous private sector studies, there is a
significant positive relationship between audit fees
and fees paid to auditors for non-audit services
(nasfee). Thus, in the charity sector also, there is
no evidence that auditors use audit fees as a form
of 'loss-leader* nor that cost savings from the joint
provision of audit and consultancy services are
passed on to the charity in the form of lower audit
fees (or consultancy fees).
Overall, the adjusted R- of 62% implies that a
good proportion of the cross-sectional variation in
audit fees is explained by the model. An appropri-
ate comparison can be made with prior studies on
smaller private sector companies, since all but a
small number of charities would be classified as
small in the UK private sector. Thus, our R- of
62% is in line with previous studies on smaller
companies (e.g.. 55% by Brinn et al.. 1994: 62%
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for the stnall-firm sub-sample in Chan et al., 1993)
but is lower than reported in large company mod-
els (e.g., 87% by Chan et al., 1993). This explana-
tory power compares favourably with that
obtained in other studies that seek to develop audit
fee models in niche tnarkets (for example,
Cullinan (1997) obtains an R- of 0.39 for the US
pension plan market).
5.2.2. Sensitivity of basic model to alternative size
proxies and specifications
Given the difficulties involved in selecting an
appropriate size proxy (see Section 3.2.1 above),
the OLS regression results for two alternative size
proxies and two alternative size specifications are
reported in Table 5 (last four columns. Models lb
through le). Model tb uses log-transformed total
assets ilnasset). Model ic uses total funds {Intotf)
and Model Id uses both incoming resources and
assets together. The final column (Model le) reports
a quadratic specification based on total incoming
resources.
Six key explanatory variables (the size proxy,
subs, stock, type, audloc and nasfee) are signifi-
cant across all models. Several variables {divers,
outlets, deb. CSR. SS, oseas and trad%) are signif-
icant in some of the models but not others. The
remaining 10 variables do not appear to be signif-
icantly related to charity audit fees in any of the
models. Thus, there appears to be substantial con-
sistency across the tiiodels. The inclusion of two
size proxies (Model Id) adds little, since results al-
most identical to those of the simpler Model 1 a are
obtained. Also, interpretation of the relative im-
portance of the two size aspects from this model is
problematic due to the significant eollinearity be-
tween the two size measures. The positive coeffi-
cient on totir and tbe negative coefficient on totir
in the quadratic specification for size (Model le)
are consistent with the expected economies of
scale in the audit process. However, this specifica-
tion has little itnpact on the significance of the
other explanatory variables. Overall, these results
suggest that the major findings are robust to alter-
native size proxies and specifications. In view of
this, later results will be presented for just one
model (Model la) based on the log-linear model
with Iniotir as the size proxy. This model has good
explanatory power and has better diagnostic char-
acteristics than the others, especially in terms of
normality of residuals, thereby leading to more ro-
bust t-statistics.
'- Grant-making charities include the likes of Save the
Children Fund, hlelp the A^eil. and Caitccr Rcseanh
Campaign. Notwithstanding Iheir classification as grant-mak-
ing, these organisaiions also undertake significant fund-raising
activities, often via trading subsidiaries.
5.2.3. Big Six premium
Based on Model la. the BIG6 coefficient is pos-
itive but not significant, suggesting that, in aggre-
gate, there is no evidence of a general Big Six audit
fee premium in the charity sector (Hypothesis 1 is
rejected). However, the coefficient B}G6 is consis-
tently positive, and three of the alternative models
in Table 5 do show relatively weak levels of sig-
nificance, suggesting that this result may be some-
what sensitive to the size proxy or model
specification. Overall, there appears to be some
(weak) evidence of a Big Six brand premium in the
charity sector (Hypothesis 1).
5.2.4. Comparison between fund-raising and
grant-making charities
The observation of a significant coefficient on
the variable type indicates that fund-raising chari-
ties pay higher audit fees, on average, than grant-
making charities. However, the potential impact
on audit fees of their different operating character-
istics merits further investigation. Table 6 (panel
A) reports the results of re-estimating Model la
separately for grant-making (Model 2) and fund-
raising charities (Mode! 3).
The major contrast between tbe two is the num-
ber of significant explanatory variables. Grant-
making charities (Model 2) have just three
significant variables compared with 11 for fund-
raising charities (Model 3). with only size (Intotir)
significant at the 1% level, the number of trading
subsidiaries (subs) at the 5% level-*- and CSR
(major activities in Culture, Sport and Recreation)
marginally significant at the 10% level. This is
consistent with the view of grant-making charities
as a relatively homogeneous group, in which size
and statutory obligations are the major determi-
nants of audit fees.
By contrast, the factors that determine the audit
fees of fund-raising charities (Model 3) are much
more diverse, consistent with greater heterogene-
ity in the group. This, and the larger number of
charities classified as fund-raising, contributes to
the similarity between the 'fund-raising' and "all
charities' results. However, there are three differ-
ences in the control variables for the 'fund-raising'
group. The sign on the diversity measure {divers)
chatiges to positive and is now significant at the
1% level, conforming with priors that audit fees
will be greater in charities with more diverse oper-
ations. The number of branches {branch) coeffi-
cient becomes significant (1% level), in the
direction expected. Fund-raising charities set up as
trusts (constT) also seem to pay higher audit fees.
Results for the Big Six experimental variable are
quite different between the two. For grant-makers.
Model 2 shows that B!G6 continues to be non-sig-
nificant, but for fund-raisers BIG6 is significant at
the 5% level. This result is confirmed using the
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Other size proxies: all five models show the BIG6
coefficient as non-significant for grant-makers,
and significant at the 5% (or 1%) level for fund-
raisers. Thus, there appears to be reliable evidence
of a Big Six brand pretnium in the fund-raising
sub-sector of the charity market. The size of the
BtG6 coefficient (0.1701) in the log-linear specifi-
cation (Model 3). is equivalent to a premium of
18.5% above non-Big Six auditors, on average
(Simon and Francis. 1988: 263, provides details of
tbe calculation).
The observation of a brand name premium in
only the fund-raising sub sector is not too surpris-
ing. Fund-raising charities have greater need of
public confidence, in order to continue to raise
funds, and therefore stand to benefit most by em-
ploying a high-profile auditor as a symbol o'i high
accountability. It is possible that this need increas-
es the relative bargaining position of Big Six audi-
tors, enabling them to charge a premium. In
contrast, it may be difficult to justify charging a
pretnium to grant-making charities where the need
for a symbol of high accountability is less, and
where the audit process is relatively straightfor-
ward. An offsetting factor is that the significant
'negative premium" charged by Ernst & Young is
partially obscuring the overall Big Six results in
the grant-making charities sub-sector.'-*
Formal tests confirmed that the two sub-sample
models (i.e., 2 and 3) are significantly different.
The Chow test is significant at the 1% level and,
using the dummy variable approach (Gujarati.
1995: 512). the coefficients on three variables are
significantly different: audloc at the 1% level
(two-tail), and bUotir and divers at the 10% level.
These tests suggest that audit fee determinants dif-
fer between grant-tnakers and fund-raisers, imply-
ing that the pooled estimates should be treated
with some caution.
•" To assess ihe importance of this impact. Ihe Big Six brand
premium regression lor grant-makers (Model 2) was re-esli-
maled with the exclusion of the (three) eharities audited
by Ernst & Young. The BIG6 coefficient increased in size
from 0,0704 to 0.2054 but remained statistically insitinificant
(t-stat = 1.43).
-'-* Formal tests again confirmed thai ihe two sub-sample
models (i.e.. 5 and 6) are significantly different. The Chow tesl
is significant al the 1% level and. using the dummy variable
approach (Gujarati. 1995:512), the coefficients on three con-
trol variables are significantly different al the 5'7( level (Iwo-
tail): aiuiloc. Iniotir and divers. The experimental dummy
variable EY is also significantly different at the 5'^Xt level.
'"^  The result for individuai Big Six firm premia are general-
ly eonsistent across all size proxies and specifications, but
with some changes in significance levels.
"' The mean (median) audit fee for fund-raising charities is
£27.730 (£18.fHH)) compared wlih 01.303 (£16,(H)0) for
grant-making charities. The mean total incoming resources are
£26.55ni and £28.56m respectively- Excluding outliers, the
ralio of audit fee to total incoming resources tor fund-raising
charities is 0.15O9(, and is slaiistically higher (al the 5'^ level,
two-tail) than the 0.11 X9r for grant-makers.
5.2.5. Individual Big Six firm brand premia
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of testing
for individual Big Six firm premia based on the
Intotir size proxy. In the 'all charities' regression
(Model 4) four of the five Big Six firms involved
in the charity seetor have positive coefficients, and
one significantly positive {KPMG) (thus hypothe-
sis 2 is partially accepted). The other firm, Ernst &
Young (£10. has a significant negative coefficient.
However, this overall picture again obscures some
differences between grant-making and fund-rais-
ing charities.^"* For grant-makers (Model 5),
KPMG is significantly positive and Ernst & Young
significantly negative, mirroring the overall re-
sults. For fund-raisers. KPMG is significantly pos-
itive (now at the 5% level) but Ernst & Young is
now positive, but not significant.^^
Thus, there is convincing evidence that KPMG
enjoy higher audit fees, especially in the fund rais-
ing sub-sector; they charge a premium of about
40%, on average, above the audit fees charged by
non-Big Six auditors. On the other hand, not all of
the Big Six seetn to benefit from their brand name.
In particular, Ernst & Young audits seem to be
priced below the non-Big Six level in the grant-
making sub-sector. There are several possible ex-
planations for this. It may be that Ernst & Young
adopt a cost-based pricing strategy (i.e.. they
choose to price below what the market might bear,
given their Big Six status). Alternatively, if there is
market segmentation between Big Six and non-
Big Six firms, the relative weakness (reduced spe-
cialism/expertise) of Ernst & Young in the Big Six
segment of the charity market may be reflected in
lower audit fees.
As a whole, these results confirm that fund-rais-
ing charities have more complex operations than
grant-making charities, and that these complexities
contribute to the higher audit fee observed.^^
Further, these complexities enable some audit
firms with a Big Six brand name to benefit from
the greater perceived assurance that the brand
name provides.
5.2.6. Expertise in non-Big Six audit firms
The results of testing whether a premium is
earned by 'specialist' non-Big Six audit firms for
expertise in the charity sector are presented in
Panel C of Table 6. First, Hypothesis 3 was inves-
tigated by incorporating a 'continuous' variable
based on market share as a proxy for specialism/
expertise. Model la (size proxy = Intotir) was re-
estimated for charities audited by non-Big Six
audit firms with the variable (specialist) based on
the number of charity auditees in the top 2.620
(Barings. 1998). There was no evidence of a pre-
mium for expertise in the 'all charities" or "grant-
makers' regressions (details not reported). This is
perhaps not too surprising in light of the evidence
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Table 6
Testing for fee premia relating to auditor characteristics. OLS multivariate regressions with Inaudfee
as dependent variable
Exp
Variable si^n
Control variables
Intotir +
subs +
divers +
outlets +
brancb +
deb +
stock +
type +
constT + or -
constA + or -
CSR + or -
KTR + or -
HM + or -
SS + or -
oseas +
trad% +
fundr% +
trust + or -
audloc +
ye +
nasfee + or -
delay + or -
opinion +
Experimental variables
BIG6 +
KPMG + or -
Cl. + or -
DT + or -
EY + o r -
PW + or -
specialist +
BH + or -
GT + or -
HCW + or -
BDO + or -
NAO + or -
constant
n
Adj Rsq
F
Jarque-Bera
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
***, ** and * represent significance
Panel A: Big Six brand premium
All charities
Model
(-'oeff'
0.4739
0.0949
-0.2057
0.0010
0.0001
-0.2589
1.5305
0.2560
0.0537
0.0925
0.1531
-0.1063
-0.0610
0.2398
0.1I6I
0.0007
-0.0004
0.0044
0.2612
-0.0469
0.0097
-0.0002
-0.1412
0.0963
-2.1104
at the 1%. 5%
la
t.stat
9.01***
-1.74*
1.27
0.90
-0.94
2.62**
^ Qg ***
0.55
0.91
1.06
-0.97
-0.56
1.98**
1.02
-0.27
1.62
1 28***
-0.48
3.47***
-0.26
-0,50
1.26
_^ 05***
210
0.624
15.47***
1.09
43.46***
Grant-makers
Model 2
coejf
0.5711
0.1458
-0.1095
0.0005
-0.0003
-1.1313
4.0164
-
-0.1202
0.2111
0.7104
-0.0853
-0.0295
0.1885
0.0400
0.0055
0.0029
0.0075
-0.0645
-0.1517
0.0098
0.0004
-0.0965
0.0704
-3.1158
t-stat
5 75 ***
2.25**
-0.69
0.44
-0.50
-1.37
1.05
-
-0.55
0.85
1.71*
-0.23
-0.10
0.72
0.18
1.13
0.90
1.18
-0.31
-0.73
1.12
0.34
-0.17
0.40
-3.34***
68
0.601
5.39***
1.58
15.27
Fund-raisers
Mode! 3
coeff
0.3995
0.0681
1.0049
0.0005
0.0004
-0.3787
1.0741
-
0.2250
0.0248
0.1616
-0.0792
-0.0910
0.2033
0.1466
0.0005
-0.0017
0.0044
0.4637
0.0745
0.0093
-0.0005
-0.3848
0.1701
-2.4814
and 10% levels respectively (two-tail)
White's {1980) heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation is i
vi'hen this is evident (i.e.. in models la, 3, 4, 7 and 8).
ised to adjust
t-siat
7.41 ***
2 74***
4.45 ***
I . I O
3 4"!***
-1.22
2.41 **
-
2 37 **
0.21
1.19
-0.64
-0.81
1.78*
1.03
3 21***
-0.98
1.27
6.01 ***
0.64
-^  45 ***
-0.64
-1.24
2.00**
A go ***
142
0.659
12.85***
6.56**
35.14*
for heteroskedasticity
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Allc
Panel B: Individual Big Six firm brand premia
ha ri ties
Model 4
coeff
0.4803
0.0919
-0.2452
0.0009
0.0001
-0.1482
1.1557
0.2363
0.0614
0.1018
0.1332
-0.1300
-0.020()
0.2744
0.1183
0.0009
-0.{)(X)9
0.0035
0.2810
-0.0630
0.0097
0.0001
-0.1675
0.2877
0.0335
0.0590
-0.4134
0.1625
-2.1416
t-stat
9.06***
4.67 ***
-2.11 **
1.22
0.91
-0.55
1.93*
2 99 ***
0.64
1.02
0.97
-1.25
-0.18
2 22 **
1.07
c^ 21 ***
-0.58
1.42
-1 A'X, * * *
-0.67
3.51 ***
0.17
-0.59
1.97*
0.24
0.47
1.43
_^ 20***
210
0.633
13.88***
0.88
41.20*
Grant-makers
Model 5
(^oeff
0.6037
0.0948
-0.2192
0.0007
-0.0000
-0.3725
3.8377
_
-0.0743
0.1079
0.5192
-0.2311
-0.0396
0.0772
0.1471
0.0048
0.0013
0.0054
-0.0034
-0.2419
0.0121
0.0011
-0.2248
0.4861
0.1429
-0.1883
-0.9400
0.1879
-3.2618
t-stal
6.28***
1.49
-1.42
0.69
-0.02
-0.46
1.07
_
-0.35
0.43
1.30
-0.65
-0.14
0.31
0.67
1.03
0.38
0.90
-fl.O2
-1.18
1.42
1.02
-0.41
1.92 ^'
0.49
-0.61
-2.30**
0.47
-3.66***
68
0.651
5.62***
0.44
23.58
Fund-raisers
Model 6
coeff
0.3962
0.0658
0.9948
0.0005
0.0(K)4
-0.2849
0.8930
0.2241
0.0377
0.1360
-0.1013
-0.0781
0,2387
0.1126
O.{)006
-0,0021
0,0040
0.4941
0.0603
0.0094
-0.0003
-0,3745
0.3439
0.0336
0.1310
0.0730
0.2018
-2.4579
l-stal
7.59***
1.96*
1.82*
0.47
1.70*
-0.84
0.89
_
1.72*
0.30
0.95
-0.65
-0.62
1.67*
0.80
2.07**
-1.06
1.37
5.34***
0.51
2 99 ***
-0.37
-1.51
2 ] 3 **
0.21
0.88
0.28
1.43
_'^  47 ***
142
0.654
10.88***
5.29*
35.41
Panel ("• Non-Big
Fund-raisers
Model 7
coeff
0.3955
0.0918
0.8420
-0.0007
0.0010
0.8! 43
-0.6966
_
0.2239
0.1404
0.0157
-0.3766
-0.0326
0.2437
0.0506
0.0012
-0.0036
0.0030
0.4442
-0.0698
0.0063
O.(KX)2
-0.6372
0.0050
-2.4478
t-stat
c^ 04 ***
2.98***
-^  47***
-1.13
2.39**
2 72 ***
-0.72
1.75*
1.02
0.11
-3.06***
-0.22
1.96*
0.29
1.96*
-1.60
0.73
4.50***
-0.44
2.13**
0.24
—5 99 ***
3.07***
-3.17***
80
0.727
10.16***
10.66***
50.94***
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Six specialist premia
Fund raisers
Model 8
coeff
0.3906
0.0882
0.7802
-0.0008
0.0009
0.6801
-0.1263
0.2379
0.1633
0.0623
-0.3418
-0.0275
0.2648
0.0699
0.0013
-0.0037
0.0029
0.5062
-0.0968
0.0072
0.0000
-0.6501
0.3994
0.2521
0.0587
0.2925
0.0604
-2.2492
t'Stat
4.72***
2.89***
3.06***
-1.27
2.40**
2 37 **
-0.11
—
1.76*
1.03
0.37
-2 73 ***
-0.18
1.97*
0.34
2.0!**
-i .57
0.68
4 4"^  w**
-0.61
1.78*
0.03
^ . 7 5 * * *
2.09**
1.86*
0.44
1.85*
0.31
-2.84***
80
0.700
7.81***
13.62***
45.97 **
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above that implies that audits of grant-makers are
relatively straightforward in comparison wilh
fund-raiser audits. Relative expertise is most like-
ly to be advantageous in the fund-raiser sub-sector.
where greater expertise is required and higher ac-
countability desired by the charities concerned.
The results for fund-raising charities audited by
non-Big Six audit firms are given in Model 7.
Comparison between Model 7 and Model 3 shows
that the explanatory power of the model improves
slightly (adjusted R- = 12.1%). and that most of
the control variables are similar for non-Big Six
audited charities, though there are some differ-
ences. In particular, deb becomes significant, but
stock ceases to be so, charities operating in the "ed-
ucation, training and research" area (ETR) seem to
have significantly lower audit fees, and charities
with a non-standard audit report {opinion) also
have lower audit fees. This last observation is con-
trary to expectation and does not appear to result
from any collinearity. This is difficult to ratio-
nalise, but one conjecture is that the audit firm
recognises the difficulties that the charity is facing
and reduces the audit fee to avoid exacerbating the
problems. The variable of prime interest in Model
7 is specialist and this is significantly positive at
the 1% level, suggesting that non-Big Six special-
ists do earn a premium for their expertise over
non-Big Six non-specialist firms [Hypothesis 3 is
confirmed).
Mode! 8 investigates whether individual non-
Big Six specialist firms earn a premium for their
expertise. Dummy variables were introduced for
the top 5 non-Big Six audit firms as outlined in
Section 3.3. Three firm dummies were significant,
one at the 5% level (Binder Hamlyn (BH)). and
two at the 10% level (Grant Thornton (GT). and
BDO Stoy Hayward (BOO)). Thus, there is some
evidence that individual non-Big Six market lead-
ers in the charity sector obtain a premium over
other non-Big Six firms (Hypothesis 4 is accept-
ed). While this evidence is consistent with a pre-
mium for expertise in the charity sector, it could
also be explained in terms of a second-tier brand
name premium.^^ Our method is unable to distin-
guish between these competing explanations.
5.2.7. Regression diagnostics
To assess the potential impact of outliers on the
regression results, intiuential observations were
" Clatworthy et al. (2000) investigated the presence of a
second-tier premium in Ihc audit tees of NHS Trust bul found
no evidence to siipporl ihis.
'^  This L-hariiy had an exceplionally high triuF/< variahic
thai arose from the scaling on a low level of total incoming re-
sources. Ils influence on the trad% coefficient is significant as
indicated by a high DFBETA.
"' Unfortunately, the existence of influential and outlier oh-
servations is rarely reported in audit fee studies (exceptions
are Turpen( 1990: 67) and Gist and Michaels (1995: 257-8t).
explored using both DFFITS and DFBETAS
measures (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch. 1980, ch. 2).
For example, in the basic model (la), one observa-
tion was identified as bighly influential,^ *^ and a
further four or 16 as possibly influential, depend-
ing on the criteria adopted. The regression model
wus re-estimated excluding each of these intluen-
tial observations individually and together as a
group of five or 17. Essentially, there were few
changes in the results. The adjusted R- values im-
proved and virtually all of the significant variables
remained so. When the groups of possibly influen-
tial observations were excluded, just irad% ceased
to be significant and one additional variable
{consiT) became positively significant at the 5%
level. Overall, the tests suggest that the results are
not driven by outlier observations.^'*
Testing for multicollinearity was carried out
using a principal components approacb, by ob-
serving whether the condition indices were below
the suggested cut-off of 15 and/or not associated
with high variance proportions on two (or more)
variables (Belsley et al.. 1980, Chapter 3).
Generally, collinearity was not a problem except
when both B1G6 and specialism variables were in-
corporated in a model, as discussed earlier in
Section 3.3.2. The assumption that the residuals
are normally distributed was tested using the
Jarque-Bera statistic (Tables 5 and 6, penultimate
row) and accepted in al! four models for "all char-
ities' and "grunt-makers*. For "fund-raisers", the
normality of residuals is reduced and is rejected at
various levels of significance in the different
models. However, the violation of the normality
assumption does not appear to be sufficient to in-
validate the use of the t-distribution in significance
testing. The assumption of homoskedasticity was
formally assessed using the Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test (Tables 5 and 6, final row) and reject-
ed at the 5% level for Models la through le, and
Models 7 and 8. Thus, the significance levels for
the regression coefficients in these models are re-
ported using White's (1980) heteroskedastie-con-
sistent covariance matrix estimation.
5.3. Charity and private sector audit fees compared
One of the objectives of this paper is to assess
the impact that the fundamental charitable nature
itself might have on audit fees by comparing the
size of audit fees paid by charities with those paid
by private sector companies. Panel A of Table 7
provides some summary measures for the sample
of charities and the company population within the
charity revenue range. The mean audit fee for
charities of £25.700 is less than one-third of the
mean company audit fee of £87.400; the median
measures show a similar picture. However, this
overstates the difference between charity and com-
pany audit fee levels, due to the limitations of this
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Table 7
Comparison of charity and company audit fees for 1997
Panel A: Comparison of charade ristics of sample charities and companies within charity revenue range I.£000)
Charities
audit fee (audfee)
total incoming resources (totir)
total assets (asset)
total funds (totf)
Companies
audit fee
total sales
total assets
shareholders' funds (shfunds)
Panel B: Comparison of charit\
All charities
audfee / totir [%]
audfee / assets [%]
audfee / totf [%]
Companies
audfee / sales \%\
audfee / assets [%]
audfee / shfunds \%]
Fund-raising charities
audfee/totir \%]
audfee / assets (%)
audfee / totf \7< ]
Obs
210
210
210
210
1084
1084
1084
1084
Mean
25.7
27.199
113.594
99.521
87.4
80.225
78,685
39,240
Median
18
13.205
15,348
10,609
54
39,205
33,652
16,433
• and company audit fee me
Obs
207
210
204
1064
1080
1044
139
142
136
Panel C: Comparison ofcharitv and si:
Audit fee / revenue 1%}
All charities
Companies (size-matched)
Obs
207
207
Mean
0.1391
0.1823
0.3658
0.2293
0.2423
0.5327
0.1496
0.2113
0.3924
Median
0.1099
0.1064
0.1504
0.1479
0.1721
0.3462
0.1223
0.1211
0.1837
Mm
0.6
313
673
1
2
346
420
-91,681
asures^-
Diffin
means
-0.0902
-0.0600
-0.1669
-0.0797
-0.0310
-0.1403
8.
8.
1
1,
Max
263
433,864
,583.934
,137.613
800
438.677
,909,284
,314.328
t-stat
-8.582
-3.592
-3.688
-6.111
-1.432
-2.760
ze-matched company audit fee measures^-
Mean
0.1391
0.2980
Diffin
means
-0.1589
t-stat
-11.547
S/an devn
29.1
44,672
643.232
611,760
92.7
96,294
148,355
82,152
p-value
(I tail)
0.0000
0.0002
0.0001
0.0000
0.0770
0.0032
p-value
(1 tail)
0.0000
Skew
4
5
11
11
2
1
6
7
.28
.54
.79
.78
.37
.69
.75
.82
Kurr
26.83
40.86
149.18
148.31
7.67
2.24
66.02
90.35
[mean of distribution of I(K)O samples]
Fund-raising charities 139 0.1496 -0.1414 -8.560 0.0000
Companies (size-matched) 139 0.2910
[mean of distribution of 1000 samples]
Notes
1. For Panels B and C, extreme outliers have been excluded
(i.e., ratios > than the upper quartilc + 10 x the inter-quartile range, and ratios < 0)
Inclusion of all outliers:
(a) Renders ratios involving total or shareholders' funds meaningless (see endnote 46).
(b) For all charities: mean audfee/totir = 0.1678; companies: audfee/sales = 0.2890; t-stat for difference =
^ . 8 5 9
(c) For all charities: mean audfee/assets = 0.1823: companies: audfee/assets = 0.2513; t-stat for difference
= -3.987
(d) For fund-raising charities: mean audfee/totir- 0.1918: companies: audfee/sales = 0.2890; t-stat for dif-
ference = -3.103
(e) For fund-raising charities: mean audfee/assets = 0.2113: companies: audfee/assets = 0.2513; t-stat for
difference = -1.807
2. in Panels B and C, 'diff in means" - charity mean - company mean.
3. Fur Panel C, the size distribution of companies (based on sales) was matched with the size distribution of
charities (based on totir) by rc-sampUng from the company sample - see text for more details.
4. The t-stat (and associated p-value) shows the likelihood that the charity sample might be drawn from a pop-
ulation of equivalent-sized companies.
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Table 8
Distribution of charity size and company comparison [based on
sales respectively)]
Revenue
£m
<20
20 - 40
40-60
60-80
80- 100
100 - 200
200 - 300
300 - 400
400 - 440
No
126
48
14
5
6
0
1
1
207
Charities
of sample
60.8
23.2
6.8
2.9
2.4
2.9
0.0
0.5
0.5
100.0
mean %
audfee/totir
0.168
0.102
0.096
0.081
0.101
0.052
na
0,030
0,028
0.139
revenue
No
336
188
102
11
72
150
81
47
11
1064
(total incoming
Companies
%
of sample
31.6
17.7
9.6
7.2
6.8
14.1
7.6
4.4
1.0
100.0
resources and
mean %
audfee/sales
0,449
0.173
0.152
0.122
0.130
0.102
0.085
0.073
0.062
0.229
basic truncated range approach, which are readily
apparent.
For example, the median revenue measure for
charities {totir) is only approximately one-third of
the equivalent company measure (.sales), and lor
assets about one-half. To get a clearer picture, the
level of audit fees relative to organisation size was
computed and these measures are summarised in
Panel B of Table 7. To reduce the significant dis-
tortion that some observations were introducing.
the measures were computed after excluding all
extreme outliers.""' For comparison, measures in-
cluding outliers are also reported in a footnote to
Table 7.
Charities pay. on average, approximately 0.14%
of total incoming resources by way of audit fee in
contrast with the 0.23% paid by private sector
companies; i.e., the charity audit fee rate is just
over half that of private sector companies. This
difference is, not surprisingly, statistically signifV
cant at the 1% level. The tests based on other size
measures yield essentially similar results.
However, the validity of these initial comparisons
remains open to criticism on two grounds.
First, the sample of charities includes both fund-
raising and grant-making organisations. As dis-
cussed earlier, grant-making charities are more
likely to have a larger proportion of investment-
type assets, to operate in a more closely controlled
manner with less transactions and have less diver-
sity of operations. Their audit costs are expected
""' Extreme outliers are defined us more Ihan 10 X inter-
quartile range above the upper quiirlile: negative measures for
audfee/shlunds are also excluded. Inclusion of iill outliers
gives meaningless results for ratios based on total or share-
holders funds because the major outlier is so extreme (e.g. for
charities. 3.875 times as large as the overall median!). For the
other ratios, outlier inclusion increased the observed differ-
ences between cbanlies and companies in all cases.
generally to be lower than for fund-raising chari-
ties as was confirmed in the charity audit fee re-
gression models. As the company sample does not
include any 'similar' financial companies, such as
investment trusts, the company audit fee ratio is
likely to be biased upwards. This would tend to in-
crease the observed difference in company over
charity audit fees. To overcome this problem, a
second set of .statistics was calculated based only
on fund-raising charities and the results are also
presented in Panel B. The charity audit fee ratios
increase, as expected, but not markedly (e.g.. aud-
fee / totir increases to 0.15% from 0.14%). The dif-
ference between mean measures for charities and
companies remains statistically significant at the
1% level, except for the asset-based ratio which is
significant at the 10% level. Thus, the charity audit
fee rate appears to be in the region of 65% of the
rate of comparable private sector companies.
Second, the size distribution of charities and
companies within the charity revenue range differs
substantially, as illustrated in Table 8, which
shows the number and proportion of organisations
within nine size intervals. For charities. 174
(84.0%) of the total sample have total incoming re-
sources of less than £40m and fall within the two
smallest size intervals, with 60.8% in the smallest
category. By contrast, only 49.3% of companies
fall within the same two smallest size intervals,
with just 31.6% in the smallest category. Thus,
there is a relatively larger proportion of small char-
ities than companies and vice versa. This distorts
the cotnparison of audit fees due to the expected
and observed economies of scale which occur in
the audit process. These scale economies are
demonstrated clearly in Table 8, which shows that
the mean level of audit fee/revenue increases sys-
tematically as organisation size decreases.
To minimise this 'size-distribution' bias, a more
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precisely size-matched sample of companies was
achieved by adopting the 'bootstrapping" method
described earlier. The method, based on total rev-
enue, was applied to lest for lower audit fees in the
sample of all charities (but with outliers excluded),
and in the sub-sample of fund-raising charities.
The results are presented in Panel C of Table 7.
For the company sample, now properly size-
matched with the all-charities sample, the mean of
the distribution of audit fee/sales was 0.298%
compared with 0.139% for charities. The t-statistic
for the difference in means is - i l .35 indicating a
very high level of statistical significance, and con-
firming acceptance of hypothesis 5. The results
based only on fund-raising charities are similar,
with the mean for the size-matched companies of
0.291% again being much higher than the mean
value (0.150%) for the charity sample. Thus, in a
properly size- and type-matched comparison, the
charity audit fee rate is approximately half that of
private sector companies.
6. Summary and conclusions
The study develops and estimates, for the first
time, a model of charity audit fee determinants. As
in previous private sector company studies, size is
the major determinant. Several dimensions of
organisational complexity (including the number
of subsidiaries, and stock level) and audit firm lo-
cation (i.e., London-based) are also important.
Specific charity sector factors that contribute in-
clude the importance of trading as a source of char-
ity income, the major area of activity in which the
charity operates, and the fundamental nature of the
charity (i.e., whether predominantly grant-making
or fund-raising). Separate models are developed
for the latter two categories of charity and the re-
sults reflect the relative complexity ot' the audit of
fund-raising charities. By contrast, grant-making
charities are relatively straightforward and their
audit fees typically have just two determinants
(size and the number of subsidiaries). Auditors*
provision of non-audit services is much less im-
portant in the charity sector than the UK company
sector. However, the somewhat anomalous posi-
tive association between audit fees and NAS,
which has been observed persistently for non-
charitable companies, is also found in the charity
sector, particulariy for fund-raising charities.
The lower auditor concentration in the charity
sector provides a valuable opportunity to investi-
gate whether large firms and/or auditor expertise
are rewarded with a fee premium. The results show
that Big Six audit firms, on average, receive high-
er audit fees for audits of fund-raising (but not
grant-making) charities.,Given that none of the
Big Six can be described as having particular ex-
pertise in the sector, this premium can be attributed
to brand name rather than any specific sector ex-
pertise. The observation of a brand name premium
in only the fund-raising sub-sector is perhaps not
surprising. Fund-raising charities have greater
need of public confidence, in order to continue to
raise funds, and therefore stand to benet"it most by
employing a high-profile auditor as a symbol of
high accountability. This may increase the relative
bargaining position of Big Six auditors, enabling
them to charge a premium. In contrast, it may be
difficult to justify charging a premium to grant-
making charities where the need for a symbol of
high accountability is less, and where the audit
process is relatively straightforward.
The size of the premium is approximately 18.5%
on average, somewhat smaller than the premium
implied in studies of UK private-sector companies.
For quoted companies, Chan et al. (1993) found a
premium of 36.7%, Ezzamel et al. (1996), 23.5%,
and for independent unquoted firms Brinn et al.
(1994) found a 28.0% premium. By contrast, nei-
ther Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1996), in their
study of medium-sized UK companies, nor
Clatworthy et al. (2000) in their study of UK
National Health Service Trusts found any evidence
of a large audit firm premium.
Of the five Big Six auditors active in the charity
sector, only KPMG (with the largest number of
charities audited) consistently earns fee premiums.
By contrast, the audit fees charged by Ernst &
Young seem to lower than those charged by non-
Big Six auditors in grant-making charities.
There is evidence that market-leading non-Big
Six audit firms in the sector are rewarded with a
statistically significant fee premium in the more
complex audit environment of fund-raising chari-
ties, but the average size of this premium above
other non-Big Six auditors is not economically sig-
nificant (only about 0.5%). However, individual
non-Big Six auditors with expertise (especially
Binder Hamlyn) do appear to earn economically
significant fee premia above other non-Big Six
firms. Such observations are consistent with a pre-
mium either related to charity sector-specific ex-
pertise or related to a second-tier brand name
premium, but our research approach is unable to
distinguish between these competing explanations.
The study also provides preliminary evidence on
the overall level of fees paid by charities relative to
those prevailing in the private sector. In a properly
size- and type-matched comparison, the charity
audit fee rate is significantly lower than that of pri-
vate sector companies: in fact it is approximately
half. The magnitude of this differential raises im-
portant issues concerning the reasons for the lower
charity audit fees. While these issues warrant fur-
ther investigation, it is likely to be difficult to ex-
plain unambiguously the lower charity fees.
However, the lower audit fees are certainly consis-
tent with auditors perceiving audit risks to be
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lower in the charity sector, and/or with auditor
altruism in not charging the 'market rate".
Unfortunately, they are also consistent with lower
quality audits, in which audit firms recognise a
lower 'market rate' in the charity sector and re-
spond by cutting costs to minimise losses incurred.
Currently, the argument that the quality of char-
ity audits might be lower than company audits is
difficult to refute. This is potentially damaging to
both charities and their auditors. A change in the
reporting of charity audit fees could improve the
situation where there is an element of 'charitable
giving' in the audit fee charged. The gift element
could be recognised as such in the income section
of the Statement of Financial Activities and the
•fuir audit fee charged against the income.
Alternatively, disclosure of the information could
be included in the notes to the accounts. Either
method would provide users of charity financial
statements with a clearer indication of the extent of
audit work performed and of the level of audit firm
altruism, both of which are hidden under current
reporting practices. This suggestion is consistent
with the move towards the valuation and recogni-
tion of gifts and services provided 'in kind' advo-
cated by the revised SORP 2^' and might usefully
be included in a future version of the SORP.
Feedback on the results from a small set of char-
ity auditors was generally encouragingly support-
ive of the main findings.'*- However, a particular
limitation is that the sample of charities was taken
from the top 500 charities, and it would be dan-
gerous to extrapolate the results to the rest of the
top 3,000 or to the large number of much smaller
registered charities.
•" Piiragraphs 107-108 of SORP 2 give details for recogni-
tion of 'gifts in kind" and paragraphs 109-110 concern "inlan-
gible income". The difficulty associated wiih valuing
voluntary help is recognised in paragraph 110 which recom-
mends thill such help should not be accounted for in the
Sialfinenl of Financial A<iiviiie\. but should be deall with in
the notes to the accounts or in the Trustees' Annual Report.
However, valuation of the cost of work carried out hy audit
firms in conducting the annual audit should not present the
same difficulty. In ihe US. FASB Statement No. 116
Aicoiiiilinfi for Coiuiibiilions Received and Conirihuiions
Mtule includes recommendations on contributed services:
'Contribiilions of sen ices are recognized only if the services
received (a) creuie or enlumce assets or (h) require special-
ized skills, are provided by individuals possessini; ihose skills,
and would typically need to be purchased if not provided by
donation'. The charging of a subsidised audit fee would seem
to tit within such a recognition rule.
"*- The 1 inal stage of ihe research process was to obtain some
feedback directly from charity auditors. An executive summa-
ry and an earlier drafi of this paper were sent out lo a small
sample of leading charity auditors for iheir comments. Seven
copies were sent oui and. alihough only three replies were re-
ceived, these provided several useful insights and additions to
the paper.
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